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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On April 29, 2004, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the European 
Community’s highest court, rendered its judgment in IMS Health GmbH & 
Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG,1 thereby clarifying the ECJ’s 
approach to the inherent tension between competition law and intellectual 
property rights.2  The ECJ expanded upon its judgment in Magill,3 in which 
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 1. Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG (2004) 
(Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 29 April 2004), available at http://www.curia.eu.int/en/ 
content/juris/index.htm (April 29, 2004) [hereinafter ECJ Judgment of 29 April 2004]. 
 2. According to Professor Cotter, “whereas antitrust law seeks to achieve economic efficiency by 
promoting competition over monopoly, intellectual property law can be viewed as an effort to achieve 
this goal by stifling competition, as least in the short term.”  Thomas F. Cotter, Intellectual Property 
and the Essential Facilities Doctrine, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 211, 227–28 (1999) (citation omitted).  See 
also JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 84–85 (1950) (stating that 
the most effective type of competition in a capitalist economy is that which arises from “the new com-
modity, the new technology, the new source of supply, [and] the new type of organization,” as distin-
guished from competition on the basis of price, quality, and sales force).  Cotter emphasizes, however, 
that most intellectual property rights do not create monopolies, since substitutes exist for most patented 
inventions, works protected by copyright, and trademarked items.  Cotter, supra, at 228.  “Nevertheless, 
most commercially successful intellectual property rights probably do confer some supracompetitive 
profit, and a few may actually give rise to monopoly power.”  Id. 
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the Court had set forth the “exceptional circumstances”4 that must be satis-
fied before a dominant firm must engage in compulsory licensing of its in-
tellectual property.5  The ECJ’s judgment in the IMS action is vulnerable to 
critique on several grounds, both because it subjects dominant firms to 
much broader duties to license than had previously been the law under 
Magill, and because it neglects to clarify some of the legal issues raised in 
the action.  First, the ECJ placed too much emphasis, in determining 
whether intellectual property is indispensable, upon the relevancy of cus-
tomers’ participation in creating intellectual property and the potential costs 
of switching to an alternative.  Second, while previous ECJ cases finding a 
dominant firm’s refusal to supply to be abusive had required the existence 
of two different markets, meaning that the dominant firm’s refusal to li-
cense an essential facility had to impede competition in a distinct down-
stream market, the ECJ accepted in the IMS action a potential or hypotheti-
cal market to satisfy the two-market criterion.  Third, the ECJ failed to 
clarify what sort of product would satisfy the condition set forth in Magill 
that a refusal to license cannot be abusive unless it impedes the emergence 
of a new product.  Finally, the ECJ neglected to elucidate the requirement 
in Magill that a refusal to license an indispensable facility must lack any 
objective business justification in order to be abusive. 
Ultimately, the particular outcome facing the parties to the IMS action 
remains to be decided by the German national court that referred the case to 
the ECJ,6 as Article 234(a) of the Treaty Establishing the European Com-
munity reserves to national courts the role of determining questions of fact, 
while the ECJ clarifies matters of EC law.7  Nonetheless, the ECJ judgment 
 
 3. Joined Cases C-241/91 & C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) & Indep. Television 
Publ’ns Ltd. (ITP) v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. I-743, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995) [hereinafter 
Magill]. 
 4. Id. at I-823 to I-825, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. at 790–91.  See infra notes 107–124 for a discussion 
of Magill. 
 5. See Magill, 1995 E.C.R. at I-833 to I-834, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. at 797–98 (ordering compulsory 
licensing, where exceptional circumstances caused the refusal to license to be a violation of competition 
law). 
 6. See Case C-418/01: Reference for a Preliminary Ruling by the Landgericht Frankfurt am Main 
by Order of That Court of 12 July 2001 in the Case of IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health 
GmbH & Co., 2002 O.J. (C 3) 16. 
 7. CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, art. 
234(a), July 24, 2002, O.J. (C 325) 33 (2002) [hereinafter EC TREATY].  Article 234(a) of the EC 
Treaty provides that the ECJ “shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the inter-
pretation of this treaty.”  EC TREATY, supra, art. 234(a).  See also Jens C. Dammann, Note, The Future 
of Codetermination After Centros: Will German Corporate Law Move Closer to the U.S. Model?, 8 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 607, 644 (2003) (“Under Article 234 of the EC Treaty, the national courts 
are competent both to find the facts and to apply the law.  The Court only has to decide on the correct 
interpretation of European Community law.”). 
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is highly significant due to the guiding principles of EC competition law 
that it enunciates for the national courts to follow. 
The ECJ judgment in the IMS action will prove especially important 
for industries in which intellectual property serves to create a particular 
“standard,” such as the information technology and software industries.  In 
these industries, one specific method of presenting information typically 
becomes so established that it emerges as a de facto standard, since it 
proves too difficult for customers to switch to another system.8  In particu-
lar, the ECJ’s judgment in the IMS action undoubtedly will influence the 
outcome of the pending EC competition case relating to the refusal of Mi-
crosoft Corporation (Microsoft) to license certain computer information to 
its rivals. 
Part II of this article examines the complex intellectual property and 
competition proceedings leading to the ECJ’s judgment in the IMS action.  
Part III analyzes the ECJ’s holding, while Part IV critiques certain aspects 
of the judgment.  Finally, Part V examines the implications of the ECJ’s 
judgment in the IMS action for the pending Commission action against Mi-
crosoft. 
II.  THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND  
COMPETITION PROCEEDINGS LEADING UP TO  
THE ECJ’S JUDGMENT IN THE IMS ACTION 
The IMS action before the ECJ arose from a complex factual and pro-
cedural history involving two parallel sets of proceedings, the intellectual 
property case heard by the national courts of Germany, and the competition 
action before the EC courts.  At issue in all of these proceedings is a copy-
right held by IMS Health in Germany in a database relating to pharmaceu-
tical sales. 
A. Brick Structures Defined 
IMS Health Inc., a U.S. firm based in Westport, Connecticut,9 de-
scribes itself as “the world’s leading provider of information solutions to 
the pharmaceutical and healthcare industries.”10  IMS tracks sales in the 
 
 8. See generally Mark R. Patterson, Inventions, Industry Standards, and Intellectual Property, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1043 (2002) (discussing de jure and de facto industry standards in industries reli-
ant upon intellectual property protection). 
 9. Philip Shiskhin, EC Dispute Pits Copyright Protections Against Antitrust, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
15, 2001, at A15. 
 10. Commission of the European Communities, Commission Decision of 3 July 2001 (Case 
COMP D3/38.044 – NDC Health/IMS Health), 2002 O.J. (L 59) 18, 18 [hereinafter Commission Deci-
sion of 3 July 2001]. 
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pharmaceutical and health care products industries in over one hundred na-
tions worldwide and supplies firms in these sectors with data on the sales 
performance of products in terms of sales by pharmacies to patients and on 
doctors’ prescriptions.11  IMS purchases the raw sales data from pharma-
ceutical wholesalers, processes it, and then sells it, “along with certain 
value-added analysis,” to firms in the pharmaceutical and health care sec-
tors.12  These firms use the data to assess the market share of their products 
as compared with competitors and to evaluate the performance of their 
sales representatives.13 
In many countries, IMS provides regional sales data in a “predefined 
segmentation known as a ‘brick structure,’”14 which the European Com-
mission has described as “a grid superimposed on a country map, grouping 
communities of doctors, pharmacies and patients” into separate segments 
called bricks.15  The reason for the brick structure is twofold: (1) to comply 
with data protection law16 and (2) to create geographical segments with 
equal sales potential.17  IMS’s clients, the pharmaceutical manufacturers 
that purchase data from IMS, use the brick structure to organize and com-
pensate their salespeople.18  These firms define a salesperson’s territory as 
a number of bricks and calculate his remuneration based upon growth rates 
 
 11. Id.; Press Release, Commission of the European Communities, Commission Initiates Formal 
Procedure Against Certain Practices of Intercontinental Marketing Services, IP/00/1207, at 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh (Oct. 24, 2000) [hereinafter Commission Initiates Formal 
Procedure].  IMS’s worldwide revenue was $1.38 billion in 2003.  IMS HEALTH INC., 2003 ANNUAL 
REPORT TO SHAREHOLDERS 55, available at http://www.imshealth.com/vgn/images/portal/cit_ 
40000873/452460112003%20Annual%20Review.pdf. 
 12. Phillip Landolt & Johan Ysewyn, Intellectual Property Rights and EC Competition Law, 
COPYRIGHT WORLD, June/July 2001, at 20; see also Commission Decision of 3 July 2001, supra note 
10, at 20–21 (describing provision of regional data services to pharmaceutical companies). 
 13. Commission Initiates Formal Procedure, supra note 11. 
 14. See Commission Decision of 3 July 2001, supra note 10, at 21. 
 15. Id. at 20.  The brick structure at issue in the IMS action includes the following data: postal 
codes of the German postal office; political boundaries; the number of residents in each segment; the 
distribution of physicians and pharmacies; mapping information such as topographic data and street 
maps; and information regarding the regional organization of physicians’ billing associations.  Id. 
 16. In the EC, personal data must be protected pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, which provides that “Member 
States shall protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right 
to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data.”  Council Directive 95/46/EC art. 1, 1995 
O.J. (L 281) 31.  Under German data protection law specifically, each brick must include at least three 
pharmacies, in order to avoid the identification of sales to individual pharmacies, and the optimal num-
ber of pharmacies per brick for this purpose is about four or five.  Commission Decision of 3 July 2001, 
supra note 10, at 20. 
 17. Commission Decision of 3 July 2001, supra note 10, at 21. 
 18. Id. 
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per brick of a particular pharmaceutical product’s market share.19  IMS 
gathers this data in a format that conforms to the brick structure it has de-
veloped, and then creates regional market reports that are delivered either 
in print, on CD-ROM, or online to pharmaceutical manufacturers.20  These 
manufacturers either review the data internally or transfer it to other firms 
for analysis.21 
B. Copyright Proceedings Involving IMS’s 1860 Brick Structure 
In January 2000, IMS introduced in Germany, through its German 
subsidiary, a new method of providing regional pharmaceutical sales data 
to its clients, using a brick structure composed of 1860 geographical seg-
ments (the 1860 brick structure).22  IMS developed the 1860 brick structure 
from earlier iterations on which IMS had been working since 1969,23 with 
cooperation from the pharmaceutical industry.24  The 1860 brick structure 
is based to a significant extent upon German postal code divisions.25  IMS 
received copyright protection for the 1860 brick structure pursuant to a 
German law that ensures intellectual property protection for databases.26  
 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Case T-184/01 R, IMS Health Inc. v. Commission, 2001 E.C.R. II-3193, paras. 5, 7  (Order of 
the President of the Court of First Instance of 26 October 2001)[hereinafter CFI Order of 26 October 
2001]. 
 23. Id. paras. 6–7. 
 24. The amount of assistance furnished by the pharmaceutical industry in creating the 1860 brick 
structure remains a point of contention in the IMS action.  IMS maintains that pharmaceutical firms 
dealt with fewer than ten percent of the segments and that their proposals for improvements were con-
sidered only in exceptional cases, whereas IMS’s competitors contend that the pharmaceutical industry 
played a crucial role in developing the individual segments.  Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. 
OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG (Report of the Registrar of the European Court of Justice on the 
Hearing of 6 March 2003), para. 3 (English translation on file with author).  See infra notes 102–105 
and accompanying text regarding the ECJ’s consideration of the significance of the pharmaceutical in-
dustry’s contribution to the 1860 brick structure. 
 25. Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, [2004] 
E.C.D.R. 9, paras. 4–5 (Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano Delivered on 2 October 2003) available 
at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh [hereinafter Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano]. 
 26. Commission Decision of 3 July 2001, supra note 10, at 23, 45.  IMS claimed intellectual prop-
erty rights in the 1860 brick structure pursuant to a provision in German copyright law that transposes 
Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Pro-
tection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20.  Commission Decision of 3 July 2001, supra note 10, at 22–
23.  This Directive, which harmonizes throughout the EC copyright protection for databases, obliges 
Member States to provide copyright protection for the arrangement, but not the contents, of original 
databases.  Council Directive 96/9/EC of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, art. 3, 
1996 O.J. (L 77) 20 [hereinafter Database Directive].  The Directive also requires Member States to 
adopt a sui generis form of database protection for the contents of databases.  Database Directive, su-
pra, art. 7.  IMS claimed rights in both the structure and contents of its database under the Database 
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The copyright extends to the specific, commercially useful organization of 
the underlying sales data, as well as the database in the format in which it is 
licensed to customers.27  However, IMS does not own the raw data received 
from pharmaceutical wholesalers, which is freely available to its competi-
tors.28 
Until early 1999, IMS had been the only provider of regional pharma-
ceutical sales data in Germany.29  In February of that year, Pharma Intranet 
Information AG (PI), a U.S. corporation, entered the German market with a 
brick structure of 2201 segments.30 Potential customers rejected this struc-
ture, expressing their strong preference for the presentation of data in the 
1860 brick format.31  This customer preference for the 1860 brick structure 
stems largely from the costs of switching to an alternative.  For example, 
pharmaceutical firms need to compare current and historical data regarding 
market shares and sales representatives’ performance, and any alteration in 
the brick structure would hamper their ability to achieve valid compari-
sons.32  In addition, many other German firms, such as market research and 
computer software companies, have designed their products to be compati-
ble with the 1860 brick structure.33  Finally, any new brick structure would 
necessitate a change in sales territories, thereby not only disturbing estab-
lished relationships between doctors and sales representatives,34 but also 
 
Directive.  Case 11 U 67/2000, Pharma Intranet Information AG v. IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG, 
Judgment of the Frankfurt Am Main Higher Regional Court, Sept. 18, 2002, at 5 (English translation on 
file with author) [hereinafter Judgment of the Frankfurt Higher Regional Court of September 2002].  
See infra notes 50–57 and accompanying text for a discussion of IMS’s intellectual property rights un-
der the Database Directive. 
 27. Maurits Dolmans & Daniel Ilan, A Health Warning for IP Owners: The Advocate General’s 
Opinion in IMS and Its Implications for Compulsory Licensing, COMPETITION LAW INSIGHT, Nov. 
2003, at 12, 12. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Press Release, Commission of the European Communities, Commission Starts Procedure 
Against IMS Health in Germany, Seeks Interim Measures, IP/01/365, at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/ 
start/cgi/guesten.ksh (Mar. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Commission Starts Procedure Against IMS]. 
 30. Commission Decision of 3 July 2001, supra note 10, at 21.  PI, which was founded in 1999 by 
a former IMS employee, ultimately was acquired in the summer of 2000 by National Data Corporation 
Health Information Services (NDC), a U.S. corporation based in Atlanta that, along with its German 
subsidiary NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG (NDC Germany), is now IMS’s adversary in the copyright 
proceedings.  See CFI Order of 26 October 2001, supra note 22, paras. 10–11; Commission Decision of 
3 July 2001, supra note 10, at 19.  NDC supplies information services in the U.S. and abroad, and, like 
IMS, focuses on the pharmaceutical and health care sectors.  Its worldwide revenue was $430 million in 
fiscal year 2003.  NDCHEALTH, NDCHEALTH CORPORATION 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 3, available at 
http://www.ndchealth.com/pdf/2003NDCHealthAnnualReport.pdf (July 21, 2003). 
 31. Commission Decision of 3 July 2001, supra note 10, at 21. 
 32. Id. at 29-30. 
 33. Id. at 22, 31. 
 34. Id. at 32-33. 
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requiring modification of the representatives’ contracts, a complicated 
process subject, under German law, to the approval of elected workers’ 
councils.35  In light of customer preference for the 1860 brick structure, PI 
introduced in 1999 regional sales reports based on a 3000-segment struc-
ture, which could be recast into either 2847 or 1860 segments.36  PI 
achieved success with this format, and was soon able to negotiate contracts 
with several customers.37 
In October 1999, AzyX Deutschland GmbH Geopharma Information 
Services (AzyX), a German subsidiary of a Belgian corporation, also en-
tered the German market for regional sales data .38 Although AzyX offered 
a flexible product that could deliver the data according to a customized 
structure, potential customers nonetheless requested the 1860 brick struc-
ture and AzyX complied.39 
In early 2000, IMS began to suspect that PI was violating its intellec-
tual property rights in the 1860 brick structure.  IMS commenced legal pro-
ceedings on May 26, 2000, when it filed a lawsuit against PI in the Frank-
furt District Court (in German, the Landgericht Frankfurt am Main) 
alleging infringement of IMS’s copyright in the 1860 brick structure as 
well as unfair competition.40  On October 12, 2000, the Frankfurt District 
Court prohibited PI from using the 1860 brick structure and established a 
potential fine in an amount up to 500,000 Deutschemarks (DM) for viola-
tion of this order.41  On October 27, 2000, the Frankfurt District Court is-
sued an interim injunction proscribing PI’s use of alternative brick struc-
tures containing 2847 or 3000 segments, or any other brick structure based 
on the 1860 brick structure, and established a potential fine of up to 
 
 35. Id. at 33.  Pursuant to German employment law, elected workers’ councils must participate in 
the decision-making process when employees’ working conditions change.  Id. 
 36. Id. at 21. 
 37. Id. 
 38. CFI Order of 26 October 2001, supra note 22, para. 8; Commission Starts Procedure Against 
IMS, supra note 29.  Like PI, AzyX was founded by former senior personnel from IMS.  Case T-184/01 
R, IMS Health Inc. v. Commission, 2001 E.C.R. II-2349, II-2353, [2002] C.M.L.R. 1, para. 3 (2002) 
(Order of the President of the Court of First Instance of 10 August 2001) [hereinafter CFI Order of 10 
August 2001]. 
 39. Commission Decision of 3 July 2001, supra note 10, at 21. 
 40. CFI Order of 26 October 2001, supra note 22, para. 8; Commission Decision of 3 July 2001, 
supra note 10, at 22. 
 41. Commission Decision of 3 July 2001, supra note 10, at 22.  This sum was equivalent at that 
time to approximately US$211,505.00.  See http://www.xe.com The Interactive Currency Table™, at 
http://www.xe.net/ict/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2004).  Germany had already agreed to adopt the euro on 
January 1, 1999 and euro currency began circulating in Germany on January 1, 2002, supplanting the 
DM as of February 28, 2002.  See xe.com About the New “Euro” Currency, at 
http://www.xe.com/euro.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2004). 
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500,000 DM for violation of this order.42  The Frankfurt District Court con-
firmed this interim injunction on November 16, 2000.43  PI appealed the 
judgments of October 27 and November 16 to the Frankfurt Higher Re-
gional Court (in German, the Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main), but 
the higher court dismissed PI’s appeals on June 19, 2001.44 
On December 22, 2000, IMS filed in the Frankfurt District Court two 
new, separate actions for copyright infringement against NDC, which had 
recently acquired PI,45 and AzyX.46  On December 28, 2000, that court 
granted IMS interim injunctions enjoining NDC and AzyX from using the 
1860 or 2847 brick structures or any brick structures derived from the 1860 
brick structure.47  On February 15, 2001, the Frankfurt District Court con-
firmed the December 28 interim injunction against AzyX.48 That court also 
rejected on July 12, 2001 NDC’s appeal against the interim injunction.49 
The intellectual property proceedings became considerably more 
complicated in September 2002 as a result of a judgment of the Frankfurt 
Higher Regional Court.50  Although that court recognized that the arrange-
ment (but not the contents) of the 1860 brick structure database merits 
copyright protection under German law,51 it held that IMS lacked standing 
to bring an action for infringement of this copyright because it does not 
possess clear title to the 1860 brick structure.52  The Frankfurt Higher Re-
gional Court also declared that German law affords sui generis protection 
 
 42. Commission Decision of 3 July 2001, supra note 10, at 22. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id.; CFI Order of 10 August 2001, supra note 38, para. 8. 
 45. See supra note 30. 
 46. CFI Order of 26 October 2001, supra note 22, para. 8; Commission Decision of 3 July 2001, 
supra note 10, at 22. 
 47. Commission Decision of 3 July 2001, supra note 10, at 22. 
 48. CFI Order of 26 October 2001, supra note 22, para. 15; Commission Decision of 3 July 2001, 
supra note 10, at 22.  On September 18, 2001, the Frankfurt Higher Regional Court vacated, based in 
part on procedural grounds, the December 28, 2000 interim injunction issued by the Frankfurt District 
Court against AzyX, with the result that AzyX was “no longer prohibited by court order in Germany 
from using the 1860 brick structure or its derivatives.”  CFI Order of 26 October 2001, supra note 22, 
paras. 17, 44.  Although it held that an interim injunction was not necessary owing to lack of sufficient 
urgency, the Frankfurt Higher Regional Court nonetheless did acknowledge IMS’s copyright in the 
1860 brick structure.  Id. paras. 44–45. 
 49. CFI Order of 26 October 2001, supra note 22, para. 13. 
 50. See generally Judgment of the Frankfurt Higher Regional Court of September 2002, supra 
note 26. 
 51. Id. at 11-13; see also supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 52. Judgment of the Frankfurt Higher Regional Court of September 2002, supra note 26, at 11–
12, 16–17.  The court held that IMS was in fact a co-author, rather than the sole author, of the brick 
structure, and recognized the co-authorship of certain pharmaceutical industry sales agents who partici-
pated in the creation of the intellectual property at issue.  Id. at 13–15. 
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for the contents, not the arrangement, of databases, and therefore does not 
apply to an arrangement such as the 1860 brick structure.53  While leaving 
open the question of how different from IMS’s brick structure competitors 
must make their own brick structures in order to avoid liability for copy-
right infringement,54 the court held that PI had indeed infringed in the in-
stant action because it had appropriated IMS’s information via software pi-
racy.55  Finally, the Frankfurt Higher Regional Court stated that IMS was 
not wrongful in its failure to license to its competitors because IMS cannot 
grant a license without the consent of its co-authors.56  By the time of this 
judgment, however, the EC courts had already begun to consider whether 
IMS’s refusal to license violated EC competition law. 
C. The Competition Proceedings Involving IMS’s 1860 Brick Structure 
After IMS initiated its copyright actions in the German courts, both 
NDC and AzyX requested from IMS licenses to use the 1860 brick struc-
ture, but met with refusal.57  Consequently, on December 19, 2000, con-
temporaneous with the copyright proceedings, NDC lodged a complaint 
with the Commission alleging that IMS had infringed Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty.58  Article 82 provides that: “Any abuse by one or more undertak-
ings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial 
part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market inso-
far as it may affect trade between Member States.”59  Article 82 further de-
 
 53. Id. at 17–18. 
 54. The Frankfurt Higher Regional Court stated that “third parties could not simply be prohibited 
from developing freely and independently a brick structure that is similarly based on a breakdown by 
district, urban district and post-code district” and therefore comprised of “more or less the same number 
of bricks.”  Commission Decision of 13 August 2003 (Case COMP D3/38.044 – NDC Health/IMS 
Health), 2003 O.J. (L 268) 69, 71 (citing the Frankfurt Higher Regional Court) [hereinafter Commission 
Decision of 13 August 2003]. 
 55. Judgment of the Frankfurt Higher Regional Court of September 2002, supra note 26, at 20–
21. 
 56. Id. at 21.  For discussion of IMS’s refusal to license its intellectual property, see infra note 57 
and accompanying text. 
 57. CFI Order of 26 October 2001, supra note 22, paras. 10, 16; Commission Decision of 3 July 
2001, supra note 10, at 22.  NDC offered an annual licensing fee of 10,000 DM, while AzyX proposed 
ten times that amount.  CFI Order of 26 October 2001, supra note 22, paras. 10, 16.  Around that time, 
seventeen pharmaceutical companies made a written request asking IMS to license the 1860 brick struc-
ture freely, to permit market competition.  Commission Decision of 3 July 2001, supra note 10, at 38. 
 58. Commission Decision of 3 July 2001, supra note 10, at 19. 
 59. EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 82 (previously article 86).  In the view of the Commission and 
the EC courts, the presence of a dominant company on a market distorts the structure of competition 
and therefore dominant firms face particular scrutiny of their trade practices.  Pat Treacy & Thomas 
Heide, Abusive Behavior: The EC Microsoft Decision, 154 NEW L.J., Apr. 23, 2004, at 608, 609.  See 
also Donna M. Gitter, The Conflict in the European Community Between Competition Law and Intellec-
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fines such abuse as including, inter alia, “limiting production, markets or 
technical development to the prejudice of consumers.”60  Article 82 repre-
sents an exception to the general rule in the EC that it is the privilege of a 
firm to decide with whom to trade.61  EC competition authorities consider 
the following three factors in determining whether there has been a viola-
tion of Article 82: “(a) a dominant position [within the common market or 
in a substantial part of it],62 (b) abuse of that dominant position and (c) a 
resultant effect on trade between Member States.”63  In some circum-
stances, a dominant firm’s “refusal to trade” with another would be an ex-
ample of such an abuse.64 
NDC asserted that IMS’s refusal to grant its competitors a license to 
use the 1860 brick structure constituted an abuse of its dominant market 
 
tual Property Rights: A Call for Legislative Clarification of the Essential Facilities Doctrine, 40 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 217, 297–98 (2003) (explaining that the EC’s strong regulation of dominant firms arises in 
part from the need to achieve a single market in a region where there are many dominant firms and also 
from an inclination to protect small and medium-sized firms). 
 60. EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 82(b). 
 61. See Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und 
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, I-7810, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. 112, 131 (1999) 
(Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs of 28 May 1998) (“The laws of the Member States generally re-
gard freedom of contract as an essential element of free trade.”). 
 62. EC law defines dominance as “a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking 
which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it 
the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately 
of its consumers.”  Case 27/76, United Brands Co. & United Brands Continental B.V. v. Commission, 
1978 E.C.R. 207, 277, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. 429, 486–87 (1978). 
As explained by one commentator, “a dominant position gives an enterprise the ability to extract 
higher prices for its goods or limit its own or others’ outputs without competing on the merits.”  Mercer 
H. Harz, Dominance and Duty in the European Union: A Look Through Microsoft Windows at the Es-
sential Facilities Doctrine, 11 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 189, 225 (1997).  The ECJ considers many factors 
when assessing dominance, including “market share, economic strength (including profitability), and 
ability to dictate actions of competitors and suppliers.”  Id.  In practice, however, a market share of at 
least forty to forty-five percent generally establishes dominance.  Christian Ahlborn et al., Competition 
Policy in the New Economy: Is European Competition Law Up to the Challenge?, 22 EUR. 
COMPETITION L. REV. 156, 162 & n.34 (2001).  See, e.g., Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v. Com-
mission, 1991 E.C.R. I-3439, I-3453, [1993] 5 C.M.L.R. 215, 279 (1993) (“With regard to market 
shares the Court has held that very large shares are in themselves, and save in exceptional circum-
stances, evidence of the existence of a dominant position . . . . That is the situation where there is a 
market share of 50% . . . .”) (citing Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission, 1979 
E.C.R. 461, 521, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 211, 275 (1979)); Commission Decision 88/589/EEC of November 
4, 1988, Case IV/32.318, London European Airways PLC v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 1988 O.J. 
(L 317) 47, 52, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. 662, 672 (1989) (“Although the Court has ruled that a 45% share 
does not automatically entail control of the market . . . the ratio of market shares held . . . is . . . a reli-
able indicator.”) (citation omitted). 
 63. Christopher Stothers, Refusal to Supply as Abuse of a Dominant Position: Essential Facilities 
in the European Union, 22 EUR. COMPETITION. L. REV. 256, 256 (2001). 
 64. Mats A. Bergman, The Role of the Essential Facilities Doctrine, 46 ANTITRUST BULL. 403, 
414 (2001). 
021505 GITTER_FMT.DOC 4/26/2005  4:30 PM 
2004] STRONG MEDICINE FOR COMPETITION ILLS 163 
position.  According to NDC, without this license, NDC would be barred 
from operating in Germany, the largest pharmaceutical market of the EC, 
and would also be unable to enter contracts for multi-jurisdictional cover-
age because it would be precluded from providing German reports.65  Al-
legedly, IMS’s conduct would foreclose the market to potential new en-
trants and eliminate all prospects of competition in Germany.66  NDC 
requested from the Commission immediate relief in the form of an interim 
order compelling IMS to grant NDC a license in the 1860 brick structure.67  
IMS countered, inter alia, that its copyright in the 1860 brick structure, up-
held by the German courts, entitled IMS to refuse to license to its competi-
tors.68 
Finding that IMS’s rivals had established a prima facie case that the 
1860 brick structure was “indispensable to compete on the relevant mar-
ket,”69 the Commission decided on July 3, 2001 to grant interim relief70 in 
the form of an order requiring IMS immediately to grant licenses for the 
1860 brick structure on reasonable, non-discriminatory terms to all firms 
currently operating in the market for German regional sales data services, 
until conclusion of the legal proceedings.71  European Commissioner for 
Competition Mario Monti emphasized the singularity of the Commission’s 
decision, declaring it “a rare step” and the market concerned “a very pecu-
liar one.”72 
Upon IMS’s request, the President of the Court of First Instance 
(CFI),73 in the first such ex parte order in nearly twenty years,74 provision-
 
 65. Commission Decision of 3 July 2001, supra note 10, at 19. 
 66. EU Opens Infringement Procedure Against U.S. Firm in Drug Data Collection, ANTITRUST & 
TRADE REG. DAILY, Mar. 16, 2001 (BNA), available at WESTLAW, BNA Antitrust & Trade Regula-
tion Daily Database. 
 67. Commission Decision of 3 July 2001, supra note 10, at 19. 
 68. Id. at 42 (noting that IMS cited Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. 
I-6211, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. 122 (1989), for the proposition that it could refuse to license its copyright to 
competitors), at 44 (stating that IMS claimed that the German courts had already established that IMS’s 
legitimate commercial interests outweighed those of its competitors). 
 69. Id. at 43. 
 70. The Commission rarely resorts to interim measures, having done so in fewer than fifteen in-
stances during the more than twenty years that it has enjoyed the power to do so.  Commission Starts 
Procedure Against IMS, supra note 29. 
 71. Commission Decision of 3 July 2001, supra note 10, at 46–48; Press Release, Commission of 
the European Communities, Commission Imposes Interim Measures on IMS Health in Germany, 
IP/01/941, at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh (July 3, 2001) [hereinafter Commission 
Imposes Interim Measures on IMS]. 
 72. Commission Imposes Interim Measures on IMS, supra note 71. 
 73. The CFI, the ECJ’s trial court, “is generally the first court to hear competition-related cases, 
and parties may appeal its decisions to the ECJ.”  Harz, supra note 62, at 193. 
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ally suspended the operation of the Commission’s interim decision.75  On 
October 26, 2001, the President of the CFI issued an interim order that 
overruled the Commission’s order of compulsory licensing, holding that 
IMS should not be forced to license its intellectual property pending the 
CFI’s final judgment on the merits of the case.76  The interim order of the 
President of the CFI relied upon three principles of EC competition law.  
First, prior case law had deemed a refusal to deal abusive only where a firm 
that was dominant in an upstream market refused to deal with rivals in a 
way that impeded competition in a downstream market, whereas IMS’s re-
fusal to deal arguably affected competition only in the very same market.77  
Second, the President of the CFI was not convinced that IMS’s competitors 
had established “exceptional circumstances,” as set forth in Magill, that 
would support an order of compulsory licensing,78 emphasizing that it was 
not clear that IMS had prevented the emergence of a new product de-
manded by consumers.79  Third, the interim order of the President of the 
CFI was based at least in part on the belief that the Commission had not ac-
corded sufficient respect to German court judgments upholding IMS’s 
copyright.80  NDC appealed the interim order of the President of the CFI, 
but the President of the ECJ dismissed this appeal in its entirety, such that 
IMS was free of any obligation to license the brick structure to its rivals 
 
 74. Cleary Gottlieb Wins Euro Court Victory Against EC, LAWYER, Nov. 12, 2001, available at 
2001 WL 11473885 [hereinafter Cleary Gottlieb Wins]. 
 75. CFI Order of 10 August 2001, supra note 38, paras. 27–29. 
 76. CFI Order of 26 October 2001, supra note 22, paras. 149–50; see also Cleary Gottlieb Wins, 
supra note 74. 
 77. CFI Order of 26 October 2001, supra note 22, paras. 80–81.  See infra notes 126–142 and 
accompanying text for an analysis of the requirement under EC competition law that two separate mar-
kets are necessary in order to establish a violation of Article 82(b) of the EC Treaty. 
 78. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text.  See infra notes 119–122 and accompanying text 
for discussion of the criterion for “exceptional circumstances” set forth by Magill. 
 79. CFI Order of 26 October 2001, supra note 22, paras. 100–106.  See infra notes 142–146 and 
accompanying text for an analysis of the requirement under EC competition law that a dominant firm’s 
refusal to deal with competitors must actually impede the emergence of a new product demanded by 
consumers in order to constitute a violation of Article 82(b) of the EC Treaty. 
 80. See CFI Order of 26 October 2001, supra note 22, para. 124 (declaring that since “the 
Landgericht Frankfurt has recognised that the creative effort underlying the 1 860 brick structure is 
worthy of copyright protection, [IMS] is justified in invoking the genuine risk of devaluation of its 
copyright”); see also CFI Order of 10 August 2001, supra note 38, para. 25 (criticizing the Commis-
sion’s failure “at least on an initial assessment, to address the argument made by [IMS] that [the interim 
measures] legitimise conduct that was previously illegitimate and are thus inappropriate . . . .”).  But cf. 
supra notes 50–56 and accompanying text (explaining the present uncertainty surrounding the precise 
parameters of IMS’s intellectual property rights in the 1860 brick structure). 
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pending final resolution of the ongoing competition proceedings by the EC 
courts.81 
As the EC courts continued to evaluate whether to require IMS to en-
gage in compulsory licensing of the 1860 brick structure, a judgment of the 
Frankfurt Higher Regional in the contemporaneous intellectual property 
proceedings absolved IMS of any responsibility to license the 1860 brick 
structure, in light of the fact that it could not do so absent the consent of its 
co-authors.82  These parallel proceedings created a potential for conflict be-
tween the national intellectual property law of Germany and EC competi-
tion law.83  For this reason, the Frankfurt District Court elected in July 
2001 to refer to the ECJ certain questions concerning the interpretation of 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty.84 
III.  THE ECJ JUDGMENT IN IMS HEALTH  
GMBH & CO. OHG V. NDC HEALTH GMBH & CO. KG 
On April 29, 2004, the ECJ fulfilled the Frankfurt District Court’s re-
quest for a preliminary ruling on certain aspects of Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty, rendering its judgment in IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC 
Health GmbH & Co. KG.85  The ECJ answered the following three ques-
tions posed to it by the Frankfurt District Court: 
1. Is Article 82 EC to be interpreted as meaning that there is abusive 
conduct by an undertaking with a dominant position on the market 
where it refuses to grant a licence agreement for the use of a data-
 
 81. Case C-481/01 P(R), NDC Health Corp. & NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG v. IMS Health Inc., 
Order of the President of the Court, [2002] 5 C.M.L.R. 1, 44 (2002).  In addition, in August 2003 the 
Commission withdrew its interim order requiring IMS to license the brick structure on the grounds that 
such urgent relief was no longer necessary for either NDC or AzyX.  Commission Decision of 13 Au-
gust 2003, supra note 54, at 71.  The former firm had achieved success with an alternative brick struc-
ture and the latter had ceased altogether its operation in the German market as of March 2003.  Id. 
 82. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 83. “While the EC Treaty provides that intellectual property protection is in the first instance a 
matter for the Member States, the Commission, and, ultimately, the EC courts, nonetheless possess the 
authority to interpret EC competition law so as to trump national copyright law.”  Gitter, supra note 59, 
at 231 (citation omitted). 
It should be noted that after Advocate General Tizzano issued his opinion in the IMS action, see 
supra note 25, NDC publicly stated that it has developed a “legally distinct” brick structure and there-
fore no longer needs a license from IMS.  See EU Court Opens Door to Intellectual Property Licensing, 
WALL ST. J. (online edition), Oct. 2, 2003.  Nonetheless, the ECJ’s judgment in the IMS action remains 
important in signaling to owners of intellectual property the extent of their rights. 
 84. See Case C-418/01: Reference for a Preliminary Ruling by the Landgericht Frankfurt am Main 
by Order of That Court of 12 July 2001 in the Case of IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health 
GmbH & Co, 2002 O.J. (C 3) 16.  The Frankfurt District Court referred these questions pursuant to Ar-
ticle 234 of the EC Treaty.  See supra note 7. 
 85. ECJ Judgment of 29 April 2004, supra note 1. 
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bank protected by copyright to an undertaking which seeks access 
to the same geographical and actual market if the participants on 
the other side of the market, that is to say potential clients, reject 
any product which does not make use of the databank protected 
by copyright because their set-up relies on products manufactured 
on the basis of that databank? 
2. Is the extent to which an undertaking with a dominant position on 
the market has involved persons from the other side of the market 
in the development of the databank protected by copyright rele-
vant to the question of abusive conduct by that undertaking? 
3. Is the material outlay (in particular in regard to costs) in which 
clients who have hitherto been supplied with the product of the 
undertaking having a dominant market position would be involved 
if they were in future to go over to purchasing the product of a 
competing undertaking which does not make use of the databank 
protected by copyright relevant to the question of abusive conduct 
by an undertaking with a dominant position on the market?86 
As noted by Advocate General Tizzano in his opinion in the IMS ac-
tion,87 the first question posits that IMS occupies a dominant position in the 
market for pharmaceutical sales data and that the 1860 brick structure is 
“essential” in order to operate in that market.88  Assuming these facts are 
correct, this question inquires whether it would constitute a violation of Ar-
ticle 82 for the dominant firm to refuse to license its intellectual property 
even if such refusal does not restrict competition in a separate market from 
that where the copyright holder uses its rights, but rather impedes potential 
 
 86. Id. para. 17. 
 87. The ECJ is made up not only of fifteen judges appointed by consensus among the Member 
States, but also of eight advocates general, appointed by the Member States acting collectively, whose 
task is “to provide the Court with an impartial and reasoned submission on the cases before it so as to 
assist it in giving judgment.”  PHILIP RAWORTH, INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 81–82 (2001).  Professor Korah describes the role of the advocates general as fol-
lows: 
Advocates General are full members of the ECJ of equal status with the judges.  Often their 
opinions provide fuller and more cogent reasoning, as they do not have to compromise.  Inde-
pendent judges, who never dissent or write individual opinions, may not be able to agree on 
the substance of their collegiate judgment but have to agree on its words, so much theory gets 
out, and even the minimum necessary to arrive at a result may be fudged. 
Valentine Korah, Access to Essential Facilities Under the Commerce Act in the Light of Experience in 
Australia, the European Union and the United States, 31 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 231, 250 
n.69 (2000).  The opinion of the advocate general in a given action typically precedes the judgment of 
the ECJ judges, who often refer to the advocate general’s opinion in their ruling. 
 88. Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, supra note 25, para. 29. 
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competitors from operating in the same market as the dominant firm.89  
Advocate General Tizzano explained that the second and third questions 
posed by the Frankfurt District Court examine further a key assumption 
upon which the first question is based: whether the 1860 brick structure is 
indeed indispensable for competitors seeking to enter the German market 
for pharmaceutical sales data, such that IMS’s refusal to license would vio-
late Article 82(b) of the EC Treaty.90 
In order to respond to the questions set forth by the Frankfurt District 
Court, the ECJ considered previous judgments pertaining to the essential 
facilities doctrine in order to determine whether the 1860 brick structure 
constitutes an essential, or indispensable, facility such that IMS’s refusal to 
license it constituted a violation of Article 82(b).91  The ECJ began with the 
German regional court’s second and third questions, which ask whether 
customers’ involvement in developing the brick structure or their potential 
costs in switching to an alternative should affect a court’s judgment as to 
whether that intellectual property is indispensable. 
A. The ECJ Emphasizes the Relevancy of Customers’ Participation in 
Creating Intellectual Property and Their Potential Costs in Switching 
to an Alternative in Determining Whether Intellectual Property is In-
dispensable 
In its judgment in the IMS action, the ECJ declared that, when consid-
ering whether a dominant firm’s refusal to license intellectual property 
constitutes an abuse of its dominant position, a national court must consider 
both “the degree of participation by users in the development” of the intel-
lectual property as well as “the outlay, particularly in terms of cost, on the 
 
 89. Id. para. 30.  See infra notes 119–135 and accompanying text for an analysis of the require-
ment under EC competition law that two separate markets are necessary in order to establish a violation 
of Article 82(b) of the EC Treaty. 
 90. Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, supra note 25, para. 32. 
 91. ECJ Judgment of 29 April 2004, supra note 1, paras. 27-47.  In a line of cases spanning over 
thirty years, EC courts have developed the essential facilities doctrine in order to enhance market com-
petition.  See generally Gitter, supra note 59 (providing a comprehensive discussion of the historical 
development of the essential facilities doctrine in EC law and its application to the IMS action).  The 
essential facilities doctrine provides that “a company which has a dominant position in the provision of 
facilities which are essential for the supply of goods or services on another market abuses its dominant 
position where, without objective justification, it refuses access to those facilities.”  Case C-7/97, Oscar 
Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, (Opinion 
of Advocate General Jacobs of 28 May 1998) 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, I-7802, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. 112, 124 
(1998).  While the ECJ did not mention the essential facilities doctrine by name in its judgment in the 
IMS action, Advocate General Tizzano did invoke the doctrine expressly.  See Opinion of Advocate 
General Tizzano, supra note 25, para. 35 (referring specifically to the essential facilities doctrine). 
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part of potential users” if they were to switch to an alternative system.92  
These two factors are closely linked, since the higher the degree of user 
participation in creating the intellectual property, the more likely that these 
users have become dependent upon it and will face unacceptably high eco-
nomic obstacles in switching to an alternative.93 
The ECJ was not persuaded by IMS’s argument that pharmaceutical 
firms’ involvement in creating the brick structure provided evidence of 
competition, in that it signaled IMS’s need to employ the industrious strat-
egy of garnering client input in order to gain a competitive advantage.94  
Nor did the ECJ accept IMS’s contention that the economic obstacles faced 
by clients wishing to switch to an alternative brick structure potentially 
could be offset by the advantages of the competing product.95 
The ECJ instead emphasized that, pursuant to its judgment in Bron-
ner,
96
 the proper criterion for determining whether the brick structure is in-
dispensable is whether a competitor could avail itself of or create an “eco-
nomically viable” alternative.97  Bronner concerned the upstream market 
for newspaper distribution in Austria and the downstream market for news-
paper publishing and sales.98  Oscar Bronner, the publisher of a daily news-
paper with a small market share, Der Standard, sought an order from the 
ECJ requiring its dominant competitor, Mediaprint, to distribute Der Stan-
dard in Austria through Mediaprint’s nationwide early-morning newspaper 
home delivery network.99  The ECJ declined to issue such an order, declar-
 
 92. ECJ Judgment of 29 April 2004, supra note 1, para. 30. 
 93. See id. para. 29 (finding it likely that users with a high level of participation in improvement 
of brick structures would face exceptional organizational and financial barriers in switching to a differ-
ent structure). 
 94. See id. paras. 26, 30.  IMS contended that judicial imposition of an obligation to license in 
cases where a dominant firm developed intellectual property using client input would be counterproduc-
tive, causing companies to avoid customer contact during product development.  Opinion of Advocate 
General Tizzano, supra note 25, para. 69. 
 95. See ECJ Judgment of 29 April 2004, supra note 1, para. 26. 
 96. Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag 
GmbH & Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. 112 (1998) [hereinafter Bronner]. 
 97. ECJ Judgment of 29 April 2004, supra note 1, para. 28. 
 98. Bronner, 1998 E.C.R. at I-7821, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. at 137–38.  Although Bronner did not 
involve intellectual property, both the ECJ and Advocate General Jacobs expressly extended their opin-
ions to encompass this subject.  See Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint 
Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, (Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs of 28 May 
1998) 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, I-7812 to I-7814, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. 112, 133–35 (1998) [hereinafter 
Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs]; Bronner, 1998 E.C.R. at I-7830 to I-7831, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. at 
144–45; see also Pat Treacy, Essential Facilities—Is the Tide Turning?, 19 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 
501, 503 (1998) (stating that Advocate General Jacobs “went out of his way to extend his Opinion to 
deal with intellectual property”). 
 99. Bronner, 1998 E.C.R. at I-7821, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. at 137–38. 
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ing that, in order to establish that Mediaprint’s home delivery scheme was 
indispensable, Bronner would have to demonstrate that there was no alter-
native method of distributing daily newspapers, and that there existed 
“technical, legal or even economic obstacles” making it “impossible, or 
even unreasonably difficult” to create an “economically viable” alternative 
home-delivery system of a scale comparable to the existing scheme.100 
While stating that, in the IMS action, “[i]t is for the national court to 
determine, in the light of the evidence submitted,” whether IMS’s competi-
tors could create an economically viable alternative to the 1860 brick struc-
ture, the ECJ noted that factors such as a high degree of participation by 
pharmaceutical manufacturers in the development of the 1860 brick struc-
ture would suggest that any competing structure would not be viable.101  
Client participation in the creation protected by copyright, if proven, likely 
“has created a dependency by users in regard to that structure, particularly 
at a technical level.”102 According to the ECJ, “[i]n such circumstances, it is 
likely that those laboratories would have to make exceptional organisa-
tional and financial efforts” in order to switch to an alternative brick struc-
ture.103  The supplier of such an alternative structure would have to offer it 
at extremely favorable terms in order to attract clients, thus, preventing an 
alternative structure from being economically viable, and rendering the 
1860 brick structure indispensable.104  Pursuant to the ECJ’s judgment in 
the IMS action, the German national court must consider both the degree of 
client participation in developing the intellectual property as well as cli-
ents’ costs in switching to an alternative in deciding whether the 1860 brick 
structure is indispensable.105 
 
 100. Id. at I-7831 to I-7832, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. at 145. 
 101. ECJ Judgment of 29 April 2004, supra note 1, para. 29. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. para. 30. 
[F]or the purposes of examining whether the refusal by an undertaking in a dominant position 
to grant a license for a brick structure protected by copyright which it owns is abusive, the 
degree of participation by users in the development of that structure and the outlay, particu-
larly in terms of cost, on the part of potential users in order to purchase studies on regional 
sales of pharmaceutical products presented on the basis of an alternative structure, are factors 
which must be taken into consideration in order to determine whether the protected structure 
is indispensable for the marketing of studies of that kind. 
Id.  Advocate General Tizzano drew the same conclusion in his opinion.  See Opinion of Advocate Gen-
eral Tizzano, supra note 25, paras. 83-86. 
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B. The ECJ Applies the Magill Criteria 
After establishing that clients’ participation in developing intellectual 
property and their costs of switching to an alternative affect the assessment 
of whether that intellectual property is indispensable, the ECJ considered 
the circumstances under which a dominant firm is obliged to license that 
intellectual property so as to comply with Article 82 of the EC Treaty.106  
The ECJ had addressed this issue previously in Radio Telefis Eireann 
(RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd. (ITP) v. Commission, 
called “Magill” after the eponymous intervenor.107  In Magill, the ECJ de-
clared that under certain “exceptional circumstances” a dominant firm’s 
mere refusal to license its intellectual property to a third party could violate 
Article 82108 and that compulsory licensing is a potential remedy for such 
an abuse.109 
1. The Background to the Magill Action.  The Magill action arose 
when three television stations broadcasting in Ireland and Northern Ireland, 
Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) of Ireland, as well as the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) and Independent Television Publications Ltd. (ITP), 
both of the U.K., all refused to license their copyrights in the information 
contained in their respective television program listings to the Irish pub-
lisher Magill TV Guide Ltd. (Magill).110  Each broadcaster published its 
own weekly guide to its respective radio and television programs, but de-
clined to permit daily or periodical newspapers to publish complete details 
of the broadcaster’s programs more than a day or two in advance, thereby 
precluding the emergence of a single independent and comprehensive 
weekly program listing for all the stations.111  Consequently, consumers in 
Ireland and Northern Ireland were the only EC citizens who had to buy 
separate weekly guides for each television station in order to obtain infor-
mation on all programs.112 
 
 106. ECJ Judgment of 29 April 2004, supra note 1, paras. 31-32. 
 107. Joined Cases C-241/91 & C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Televi-
sion Publications Ltd. (ITP) v. Commission, [1995] E.C.R. I-743, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter 
Magill]. 
 108. Id. at I-822 to I-825, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. at 790–91. 
 109. Id. at I-833 to I-834, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. at 797–98. 
 110. Id. at I-811 to I-812, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. at 782–83. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Joined Cases C-241/91 & C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) & Indep. Television 
Publ’ns Ltd. v. Commission, (Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann of 1 June 1994) 1995 E.C.R. I-
743, I-748 to I-749, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 718, 726–27 (1995) [hereinafter Opinion of Advocate General 
Gulmann]. 
021505 GITTER_FMT.DOC 4/26/2005  4:30 PM 
2004] STRONG MEDICINE FOR COMPETITION ILLS 171 
In 1986, Magill published for a brief time a comprehensive weekly 
television guide that competed with the broadcasters’ guides, and the three 
broadcasters responded by commencing copyright actions in the Irish and 
English national courts.113  Similarly to the IMS action, the national courts 
upheld the copyrights,114 and Magill lodged a complaint with the Commis-
sion alleging that the three broadcasters’ refusals to license constituted an 
abuse of dominant position in violation of Article 82.115  The Commission 
required the broadcasters to grant Magill copyright licenses,116 and both the 
CFI117 and the ECJ upheld the Commission decision.118 
The ECJ set forth in Magill “exceptional circumstances” that must be 
present before a mere refusal to license intellectual property, absent any 
other anticompetitive behavior, constitutes a violation of Article 82.119  
First, the refusal to license must prevent “the appearance of a new product” 
for which there is “potential consumer demand.”120  Second, the refusal to 
license must lack any business justification.121  Third, the refusal to license 
must have the effect of excluding all competition in a secondary, down-
 
 113. Id. at I-749 to I-750, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. at 727. 
 114. Id.; see also Case T-69/89, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. II-485, II-494 
to II-495, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 586, 595–96 (1991) (Ct. First Instance) [hereinafter RTE] (quoting the 
Irish High Court’s judgment in favor of the broadcasters under Irish copyright law); Case T-76/89, In-
dep. Television Publ’ns Ltd. v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. II-575, II-582 to II-583, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 
745, 752–53 (1991) (Ct. First Instance) [hereinafter ITP] (same); Commission Decision 89/205/EEC of 
21 December 1988, Case IV/31.851, Magill TV Guide/ITP, BBC and RTE, 1989 O.J. (L 78) 43, 45 
(citation omitted) [hereinafter Commission Decision in Magill] (stating that the U.K. courts expressly 
confirmed copyright protection for television program listings under U.K. law). 
 115. Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann, 1995 E.C.R. at I-750, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. at 727. 
 116. Commission Decision in Magill, 1989 O.J. (L 78) at 50–51. 
 117. See RTE, 1991 E.C.R. at II-523, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 620; Case T-70/89, British Broadcasting 
Corp. & BBC Enters. Ltd. v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. II-535, II-568, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 669, 698 
(1991) (Ct. First Instance) [hereinafter BBC]; ITP, 1991 E.C.R. at II-604, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 770. 
 118. Magill, 1995 E.C.R. at I-825, I-837, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. at 791, 799. 
 119. Id. at I-823, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. at 790.  Of course, the mere refusal to license intellectual 
property cannot in itself constitute an abuse of a dominant position, or else the law would deprive hold-
ers of intellectual property of the very essence of the right conferred by intellectual property protection, 
the right to exclude others from using it.  See ECJ Judgment of 29 April 2004, supra note 1, para. 34 
(citing Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd. (Volvo), 1988 E.C.R. I-6211, 6235, [1989] 4 
C.M.L.R. 122, 135 (1989), and Magill, 1995 E.C.R. at I-823, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. at 790).  As observed 
by Advocate General Tizzano, such an interpretation would “have very serious and undesirable conse-
quences for the market economy inasmuch as it would deprive the owners of an intellectual property 
right of the due recompense for their creative endeavour and would act as a disincentive to investments 
in innovation and research.”  Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, supra note 25, para. 34. 
 120. Magill, 1995 E.C.R. at I-824, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. at 791.  In Magill, the ECJ recognized a 
comprehensive weekly television guide as a new product.  Id. 
 121. Id. 
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stream market.122  While it remained ambiguous after Magill whether these 
three criteria were cumulative,123 the ECJ stated explicitly in its IMS judg-
ment that they were indeed cumulative124 and proceeded to apply them in 
the instant action.125 
2. The ECJ Accepts a “Potential” or “Hypothetical” Market to Sat-
isfy the Two-Market Criterion in Magill.  The ECJ began its application of 
the Magill criteria to the IMS action by analyzing the third condition, that 
refusal to license the intellectual property must have the effect of excluding 
all competition in a secondary, downstream market for it to be deemed 
abusive.126  The reason for the two-market requirement is that firms un-
doubtedly would decline to enter a particular market if they had to share 
their essential facility with rivals competing in exactly the same market.127  
With respect to intellectual property in particular, the very essence of that 
right is the ability to exclude others from using it, and the inability to do so 
will destroy incentives to invest in the creation of intellectual property.128 
In order to interpret the two-market requirement in the context of the 
IMS action, IMS, NDC, and the Commission all relied upon Magill, a case 
involving intellectual property, but applied the precedent differently.  IMS 
sought to distinguish its situation from Magill by asserting that IMS’s rivals 
did not seek access to the 1860 brick structure in order to compete in a sec-
ondary market, but rather to operate in the very same market for regional 
pharmaceutical sales data services in Germany. 129  According to IMS, all 
previous judgments of the EC courts and all Commission decisions in es-
 
 122. Id.  In Magill, the ECJ recognized two separate markets, the upstream market in television 
program listings and the downstream market in television guides.  See id. (referring to “the secondary 
market of weekly television guides”). 
 123. In a 2002 article written before the ECJ judgment in the IMS action, Professor Korah sug-
gested that she read the “special circumstances [in Magill] as being cumulative, but later cases have 
suggested that they are alternatives.”  Valentine Korah, The Interface Between Intellectual Property and 
Antitrust: The European Experience, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 801, 811 (2002). 
 124. ECJ Judgment of 29 April 2004, supra note 1, para. 38. 
 125. Id. paras. 46–52. 
 126. Id. para. 46; see also supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 127. Gitter, supra note 59, at 278. 
 128. See supra note 119.  Commentators have observed that the essential facilities doctrine “is most 
likely to condemn intellectual property in precisely those circumstances in which this result is least de-
fensible,” because, in general, “the more an invention is unique, valuable, and difficult to duplicate, the 
greater is the obligation to share it.” Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1219 (1999). 
 129. ECJ Judgment of 29 April 2004, supra note 1, para. 32. 
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sential facilities actions involved distinct upstream and downstream mar-
kets.130 
NDC, however, maintained that two distinct markets are not essential 
in order for the ECJ to find that a refusal to license violates Article 82.131  
According to NDC, pursuant to Magill, the ECJ could find that a dominant 
firm’s refusal to license an indispensable facility violated Article 82 simply 
because that firm holds a monopoly on information necessary for compet-
ing with it, even if that information is not offered on a separate market.132 
For its part, the Commission interpreted the two-market requirement 
set forth in Magill by focusing upon various stages of production as op-
posed to the existence of separate markets.133  The Commission maintained 
that, in order to satisfy the third condition of Magill, the essential input 
“must be distinguishable from the downstream goods or services and be-
tween it and the downstream product or service added value must be cre-
ated.”134  According to the Commission, this reasoning applies even where 
the essential input is an intangible asset protected by copyright, since the 
dominant company’s refusal to license would extend beyond the purpose of 
the copyright, effectively granting that company a monopoly over the mar-
ket for the downstream product or service.135  The Commission thus recog-
nized two separate markets in the IMS action, an upstream market in the 
 
 130. Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, supra note 25, para. 35 n.33 (listing several cases men-
tioned by IMS as standing for the proposition that previous essential facilities case law had always in-
volved two distinct markets).  See also CFI Order of 26 October 2001, supra note 22, para. 80 (“The 
previous case-law where the Community judicature and, before the adoption of [the Commission Deci-
sion of 3 July 2001], the Commission have considered refusal to supply by a dominant undertaking in 
such circumstances to be abusive has always involved two different markets.”). 
 131. ECJ Judgment of 29 April 2004, supra note 1, para. 33. 
 132. Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, supra note 25, para. 41.  It should be noted, however, 
that in Magill the ECJ did recognize two separate markets, the upstream market in television program 
listings and the downstream market in television guides.  See Magill, 1995 E.C.R. I-743, I-824, [1995] 4 
C.M.L.R. 718, 791 (1995) (stating that the broadcasters had “reserved to themselves the secondary 
market of weekly television guides by excluding all competition on that market”); see also Landolt & 
Ysewyn, supra note 12, at 20 (stating that the market for television listings is a “severable offshoot of a 
separate and distinguishable activity, that is television broadcasting”).  Indeed, even before Magill 
sought licenses from the broadcasters, a downstream market of sorts existed for the television listings in 
the sense that daily and periodical newspapers sought and received permission to reprint an abbreviated 
version of the listings.  Magill, 1995 E.C.R. at I-812, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. at 782–83.  On the other hand, 
the information protected by copyright did not command a price on this market, and was provided to the 
newspapers free of charge.  Id. 
 133. Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, supra note 25, para. 43. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. para. 45.  See also Patterson, supra note 8, at 1076–78 (stating that IMS’s copyright in the 
1860 brick structure does not entitle it to monopoly profits in the market for pharmaceutical sales data 
services). 
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1860 brick structure protected by copyright and a downstream market for 
regional pharmaceutical sales data services in Germany.136 
The ECJ resolved the debate over the two-market hypothesis, stating 
that there need not exist two entirely separate markets so long as “a poten-
tial market or even hypothetical market can be identified” for the upstream 
input.137  Invoking Bronner, the ECJ noted that the fact that the dominant 
firm, Mediaprint, did not market its nationwide newspaper distribution ser-
vice separately “was not regarded as precluding, from the outset, the possi-
bility of identifying a separate market” for the publication and sale of 
newspapers.138  The ECJ cited with approval the Opinion of Advocate Gen-
eral Tizzano,139 who stated that he considered it “sufficient that it is possi-
ble to identify a market in upstream inputs, even where the market is a po-
tential one only.”140  He set forth the following legal test for identifying a 
separate market for upstream inputs, even if they are not marketed inde-
pendently: 
a) [T]he inputs in question are essential (since they cannot be substi-
tuted or duplicated) to operating on a given market; [and] 
b) there is actual demand for them on the part of undertakings seeking 
to operate on the market for which those inputs are essential.141 
As for the application of this test to the facts of the IMS action, Advo-
cate General Tizzano expressed the opinion that “it is not hard to identify 
an upstream market for access to the brick structure (monopolised by the 
owner of the copyright) and a secondary downstream market for the sale of 
the studies” of regional pharmaceutical sales.142  In light of the national 
 
 136. Commission Decision of 3 July 2001, supra note 10, at 43. 
 137. ECJ Judgment of 29 April 2004, supra note 1, para. 44. 
 138. Id. para. 43.  As observed by Advocate General Tizzano with respect to Bronner, although 
Mediaprint did not market separately its nationwide service for home delivery of newspapers, Me-
diaprint did furnish this service to a third party.  Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, supra note 25, 
para. 56 n.48.  While this fact might suggest the existence of an entirely autonomous market for news-
paper home delivery services, Mediaprint did not market its newspaper delivery service independently, 
but rather included it as part of a package with other services, including printing and distribution to ki-
osks.  Id.; see also Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag 
GmbH & Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, I-7821, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. 112, 138 (1998) (describing Me-
diaprint’s sale of bundled services to an independent publisher). 
Advocate General Tizzano also noted that in Magill the ECJ identified a separate market in televi-
sion listings even though the broadcasters did not market the listings independently, but furnished them 
free of charge to certain newspapers.  Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, supra note 25, para. 56.  
See also supra note 132 and accompanying text (describing the dissemination of the television listings 
at issue in Magill). 
 139. ECJ Judgment of 29 April 2004, supra note 1, para. 44. 
 140. Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, supra note 25, para. 57. 
 141. Id. para. 59. 
 142. Id. para. 60. 
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court’s role in determining factual matters,143 the ECJ referred to the Ger-
man national court the question whether the 1860 brick structure is an up-
stream product that is indispensable for the downstream supply of German 
regional sales data relating to pharmaceutical products.144 
3. The ECJ Reiterates the Magill Requirement That a Refusal to Li-
cense Is Abusive Only Where It Prevents the Emergence of a New Product. 
The ECJ then turned to the first criterion set forth in Magill as neces-
sary to support a finding of abuse of a dominant position in violation of Ar-
ticle 82, the requirement that a dominant firm’s refusal to license inhibits 
the emergence of a new product for which there is potential consumer de-
mand.145  The ECJ held that the refusal by a dominant firm to license intel-
lectual property that is indispensable for operating in a secondary market is 
abusive only where the firm requesting the license “does not intend to limit 
itself essentially to duplicating the goods or services already offered on the 
secondary market by the owner of the copyright, but intends to produce 
new goods or services not offered by the owner of the right and for which 
there is a potential consumer demand.”146  The reason for this requirement 
is to enhance market competition for the ultimate benefit of consumers, 
which is the fundamental goal of competition law.147 
 
 143. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 144. ECJ Judgment of 29 April 2004, supra note 1, para. 47. 
 145. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 146. ECJ Judgment of 29 April 2004, supra note 1, para. 49. 
Advocate General Tizzano had described this requirement somewhat differently, stating that the 
party requesting a license cannot 
limit itself essentially to duplicating the goods or services already offered on the secondary 
market by the owner of the intellectual property right but intends to produce goods or services 
of a different nature which, although in competition with those of the owner of the right, an-
swer specific consumer requirements not satisfied by existing goods or services. 
Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, supra note 25, para. 66. 
Some commentators have criticized Advocate General Tizzano’s formulation of this test as too 
easily satisfied by potential competitors, as it requires merely a product with different characteristics, as 
opposed to an entirely new product.  See Dolmans & Ilan, supra note 27, at 15.  The wording of the ECJ 
judgment, however, seems to hew to the original standard set forth in Magill.  Compare ECJ Judgment 
of 29 April 2004, supra note 1, para. 49 (stating that a refusal to license is abusive only where the party 
requesting the license “intends to produce new goods or services not offered by the owner of the right 
and for which there is a potential demand”) with Magill, 1995 E.C.R. at I-824, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. at 
791 (finding a refusal to license abusive where it “prevented appearance of new product . . . which [the 
owner of the right] did not offer and for which there is a potential customer demand”). 
 147. See Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und 
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, (Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs Delivered on 28 May 
1998) 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, I-7811, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. 112, 132-33 (1998) (emphasizing that “it is im-
portant not to lose sight of the fact that the primary purpose of [Article 82] is to prevent distortion of 
competition — and in particular to safeguard the interests of consumers — rather than to protect the 
position of particular competitors”). 
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NDC asserted that it does indeed intend to offer a different, better 
product, namely a superior method of presenting regional sales data to 
pharmaceutical clients.  According to NDC, its product would present a 
wider and more useful spectrum of data, offer convenient online accessibil-
ity, and feature a more customer-friendly format.148  IMS, however, con-
tended that NDC sought access to the 1860 brick structure simply to offer a 
duplicative product.149  The ECJ referred this factual determination to the 
German national court.150 
4. The ECJ Focuses Little on the Magill Requirement That a Refusal 
to License Must Prove “Unjustified” for it to Violate Competition Law.  
The ECJ paid only cursory attention to the final Magill requirement, that 
the intellectual property holder’s refusal to license must prove unjustified 
in order for it to violate Article 82.151  In general, EC case law provides lit-
tle guidance as to what types of business justifications constitute legitimate 
defenses in a refusal to supply case.152  What is clear is that it is lawful for a 
dominant firm to compete on the basis of performance, even if such compe-
tition excludes rivals.153  However, while a “dominant company may al-
ways make its own goods or services better for consumers,” it “may not 
take steps that merely make its competitors’ worse or discriminate against 
its downstream competitor.”154  The test of the legitimacy of the business 
justification proffered for the refusal to supply is an objective one that 
 
 148. Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, supra note 25, paras. 39-40. 
 149. See id. para. 36 (stating that IMS contends that NDC seeks access to the 1860 brick structure 
in order to furnish an “almost identical” product). 
 150. ECJ Judgment of 29 April 2004, supra note 1, para. 49–50. 
 151. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 152. Gitter, supra note 59, at 249 n.155; see also James S. Venit & John J. Kallaugher, Essential 
Facilities: A Comparative Law Approach, in 1994 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST., INTERNATIONAL 
ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY 315, 317 n.6 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1995) (“There are few, if any, pub-
lished cases in which a legitimate business justification for a refusal to supply has been accepted by the 
Courts or the Commission”); John Temple Lang, Defining Legitimate Competition: Companies’ Duties 
to Supply Competitors and Access to Essential Facilities, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 437, 522 (noting that 
“there is relatively little case law on what constitutes legitimate business justification” in the EC). 
 153. VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE 
107, 107–08 (7th ed. 2000) (noting that such competition includes “price competition (if not predatory); 
improvement in quality, including [research & development]; . . . services to customers; even advertis-
ing”). 
 154. Temple Lang, supra note 152, at 480; see also Christopher Stothers, The End of Exclusivity? 
Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights in the E.U., 24 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 86, 89 (2002) (“[T]he 
dominant undertaking must not refuse access for anti-competitive reasons, which include the commer-
cially justifiable aim of reaping a monopoly rent by restricting access to prevent competition.”). 
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hinges upon the effects of the dominant firm’s behavior, rather than its in-
tent.155 
In the IMS action, the ECJ declared that “no specific observations 
have been made” as to whether IMS’s refusal to license the brick structure 
“is justified by objective considerations.”156  The ECJ then referred this 
question to the German national court.157 
IV.  A CRITIQUE OF THE ECJ JUDGMENT IN IMS HEALTH  
GMBH & CO. OHG V. NDC HEALTH GMBH & CO. KG 
The ECJ’s judgment in the IMS action is vulnerable to critique on 
several grounds, both because it subjects dominant firms to much broader 
duties to license than had previously been the law under Magill, and also 
because it neglects to clarify some of the legal issues raised by the parties.  
First, the ECJ placed too much emphasis, in determining whether intellec-
tual property is indispensable, upon the relevancy of customers’ participa-
tion in creating intellectual property and their potential costs in switching to 
an alternative.  Second, while previous EC cases finding a dominant firm’s 
refusal to supply to be abusive had required the existence of two different 
markets, meaning that the dominant firm’s refusal to license an essential 
facility had to impede competition in a distinct downstream market, the 
ECJ accepted a potential or hypothetical market to satisfy the two-market 
criterion in the IMS action.  Third, the ECJ failed to clarify what sort of 
product will satisfy the condition set forth in Magill that a refusal to license 
cannot be abusive unless it impedes the emergence of a new product.  Fi-
nally, the ECJ neglected to elucidate the requirement in Magill that a re-
fusal to license an indispensable facility must lack any objective business 
justification in order to be abusive. 
 
 155. Temple Lang, supra note 152, at 522 (noting that abuse under Article 82 "is normally objec-
tive and intent is irrelevant"); see also Korah, supra note 153, at 107 (citing Kallaugher for the proposi-
tion that "the concept of abuse is objective as opposed to subjective — it does not depend on the ill will 
of the dominant firm, or even on an intention to foreclose"). 
 156. ECJ Judgment of 29 April 2004, supra note 1, para. 51.  Advocate General Jacobs’s opinion in 
Bronner suggests that EC competition authorities and courts would accept many of the same business 
justifications as U.S. courts, including “legitimate technical or commercial reasons” or “on grounds of 
efficiency.”  Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und 
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG (Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs Delivered on 28 May 
1998), 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, I-7808, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. 112, 129 (1998) (citations omitted). 
 157. ECJ Judgment of 29 April 2004, supra note 1, para. 51. 
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A. The ECJ’s Judgment in the IMS Action Subjects Firms to Too Broad a 
Duty to License Their Intellectual Property by Placing Excessive Em-
phasis on the Relevancy of Customers’ Participation in Creating Intel-
lectual Property and Their Switching Costs 
In holding that customers’ participation in creating intellectual prop-
erty and their potential costs in switching to an alternative are important 
factors to consider when deciding whether intellectual property is indispen-
sable, the ECJ gave these factors too much weight.  Customer participation 
in the creation of intellectual property is commonplace and necessary, as it 
is precisely the value of intellectual property to the user that renders it wor-
thy of protection.158  Commentators have cited as examples of accepted 
customer involvement in the creation of intellectual property the beta test-
ing of computer software by its ultimate users, as well as medical manufac-
turers’ consultations with physicians in the development of medical prod-
ucts.159  Indeed, the very purpose of granting intellectual property 
protection is to stimulate innovation that will satisfy the demands of the 
market and that would not otherwise occur absent the incentive provided by 
intellectual property protection.160 
In the context of the IMS action in particular, while the input of the 
pharmaceutical firms was undoubtedly helpful in creating the 1860 brick 
structure, wholesalers and pharmaceutical firms admitted, in a report relat-
ing to a recent U.K. merger case involving IMS, that they would not want 
to develop such pharmaceutical data services themselves.161  The pharma-
ceutical companies noted that “it would not be cost-effective” for them to 
carry out such services in-house and that they “lacked the expertise neces-
 
 158. Gitter, supra note 59, at 287. 
 159. Dolmans & Ilan, supra note 27, at 16.  These authors are, it should be noted, lawyers with the 
firm that represents IMS in the proceedings before the ECJ, the CFI, and the European Commission.  Id. 
at 12. 
 160. See, e.g., Bergman, supra note 64, at 425 (noting that the patent system aims “to stimulate 
investments by creating exclusive property rights” and that it would therefore prove “inconsistent and 
detrimental for efficiency to demand that the successful innovator share[] its patents with others”). 
 161. Monopolies and Mergers Commission, IMS Health Inc. and Pharmaceutical Marketing 
Services Inc.: A Report on the Merger Situation, § 2.55, http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/ 
rep_pub/reports/1999/425ims.htm#full (February 1999) [hereinafter Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission].  One can infer that these multinational pharmaceutical firms were the very same ones 
surveyed by the Commission in the IMS competition action.  Compare id. § 2.59 (noting that IMS’s 
customers are often global companies) with Commission Decision of 3 July 2001, supra note 10, at 27 
(stating that the firms responding to the Commission’s survey in the IMS case included “almost all of 
the largest companies”). 
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sary to do so.”162  The firms also described collaboration as unlikely “given 
the extent of competition between the companies,” whereas “IMS, in con-
trast, has a reputation for neutrality of information, enhancing its value to 
the pharmaceutical industry.”163  Thus, pharmaceutical manufacturers are 
unlikely to have created the 1860 brick structure on their own, and the 
availability of intellectual property protection for databases stimulated 
IMS’s involvement.164 
Customer involvement, while not of great importance in a competition 
action, is properly considered in the context of an intellectual property ac-
tion.  A significant degree of customer involvement might affect a court’s 
assessment of who possesses ownership rights in that property, as the 
Frankfurt Higher Regional Court concluded in the IMS action.165 
The ECJ also erred in holding that customers’ switching costs are 
relevant for determining whether an intellectual property right is indispen-
sable.  As noted previously, these costs arise from the pharmaceutical 
firms’ need to retain the 1860 brick structure so as to compare current and 
historical data regarding market shares and sales representatives’ perform-
ance; from the fact that other products, such as computer software, have 
been designed for compatibility with the 1860 structure; and also from the 
fact that a change in the brick structure would require modification of sales 
territories, which would not only disturb relationships between doctors and 
sales representatives, but also engender a complicated legal process of se-
curing the approval of workers’ councils for such changes.166  Dolmans and 
 
 162. Monopolies and Mergers Commission, supra note 161, § 2.61. 
 163. Id.  § 2.55. 
 164. In the IMS action in particular, it is difficult to determine the precise role that copyright pro-
tection played in encouraging IMS’s efforts in the German market.  On the one hand, the 1996 Database 
Directive pursuant to which IMS claimed protection for the 1860 brick structure, see supra note 26 and 
accompanying text, was not yet in force when IMS entered the German market in the 1970s.  On the 
other hand, copyright protection for databases was available in Germany under the provisions of Ger-
man law that transpose the Berne Convention, which provides: “Collections of literary or artistic works 
such as encyclopaedias and anthologies which, by reason of the selection and arrangement of their con-
tents, constitute intellectual creations shall be protected as such, without prejudice to the copyright in 
each of the works forming part of such collections.” Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, art. 2(5), 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (as amended).  Neverthe-
less, it was more difficult to obtain copyright protection for databases before the enactment of the Data-
base Directive.  E-mail from Hans Christian Liebig, Researcher, University of Mannheim, to Donna M. 
Gitter, Assistant Professor of Legal and Ethical Studies, Fordham University Schools of Business (Feb. 
13, 2003, 09:10:58 GMT +1) (on file with author). 
 165. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (referring to the judgment of the Frankfurt Higher 
Regional Court recognizing co-authorship of the 1860 brick structure by certain pharmaceutical indus-
try sales agents who participated in its creation). 
 166. See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text. 
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Ilan argue that these costs do not make the 1860 brick structure an essential 
facility because 
[c]ustomer preferences and switching costs are not barriers to entry im-
posed or difficulties caused by a dominant firm and, absent network ef-
fects, the cost of switching to the dominant firm’s product might be just 
as high as the cost of switching away from it.  The new firm does not 
normally face costs that the incumbent did not.167 
Certainly, when the pharmaceutical firms first adopted the 1860 brick 
structure, they faced costs such as making their operations compatible with 
the structure and adjusting sales representatives’ territories. 
The argument asserted by Dolmans and Ilan becomes more problem-
atic, however, when they state that “[t]he test of an essential facility is 
whether competitors are objectively able to develop and offer their own 
products or services for sale, not whether buyers are willing to buy 
them.”168  This objective test derives from language in Bronner stating that 
a facility is indispensable only insofar as there are  “technical, legal or even 
economic obstacles” making it “impossible, or even unreasonably difficult” 
to create an “economically viable” alternative.169  While Dolmans and Ilan 
are correct to point out that this objective test hinges on an analysis of 
competitors’ costs, not customer preferences, the reality is that customers’ 
switching costs do indeed affect the viability of competitors’ alternatives.  
If the switching costs facing pharmaceutical firms are prohibitive, IMS’s 
competitors will not be able to compete on the basis of price, and therefore 
will be objectively unable, as a practical matter, to develop a viable alterna-
tive brick structure.  Since the purpose of competition law is to protect 
market competition for the benefit of consumers,170 courts considering es-
sential facilities cases may wish to consider any potential economic barrier 
to entry, even if that barrier was not caused by the dominant firm and was 
likewise faced by the dominant firm at one time. 
The response to such an argument, of course, is that the objective test 
in Bronner did not arise in the context of an intellectual property action.171  
In cases concerning intellectual property, EC courts must consider how to 
weigh the positive effect that compulsory licensing will have upon market 
competition in the short run, versus the negative effect ex ante that compul-
 
 167. Dolmans & Ilan, supra note 27, at 16. 
 168. Id. at 15–16 (citing the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Bronner). 
 169. Bronner, 1998 E.C.R. at I-7831 to I-7832, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. at 145; see supra notes 96–100 
and accompanying text. 
 170. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 171. But see supra note 98 and accompanying text (noting that although Bronner did not concern 
intellectual property, both the ECJ and Advocate General Jacobs expressly extended their opinions to 
encompass this subject). 
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sory licensing will have upon a firm that is deciding whether to invest in a 
particular market.172  This analysis ex ante is critical in cases involving in-
tellectual property rights, which were conceived as a governmentally sanc-
tioned limited monopoly for the very purpose of stimulating innovation.173  
Deprived of the ability to recoup their investment in developing intellectual 
property through exercise of their limited monopoly rights, firms would not 
have incentive to innovate. 
As noted by one commentator, competition law evolved largely in the 
context of tangible goods, whereas developed economies increasingly rely 
upon the creation of “information goods” such as software.174  Information 
goods, which often enjoy intellectual property protection, tend to give rise 
to monopolistic markets, because “[t]he sunk cost component seems effec-
tively to play the dual role of consolidating on the one hand and of increas-
ing demand and/or creating barriers to entry for potential competitors on 
the other hand.”175  As a result, with respect to information goods, “one 
finds indeed a pattern of progressive concentration, both at [a] national and 
international level” with information goods “increasingly created and ex-
ploited by ever larger groups on a market with a shrinking number of sig-
nificant competitors.”176  The availability of copyright protection for data-
bases such as the 1860 brick structure both encourages the creation of such 
information goods and results in a monopolistic market, and a thorough re-
examination of the optimal means of structuring copyright law will prove 
more effective than competition law in dealing with this situation.177  One 
 
 172. Professor Bergman explains the short- and long-run effects of the essential facilities doctrine 
as follows: 
[T]he effect of the doctrine is similar to the effect of a price regulation of that stage of produc-
tion — i.e., prices will be reduced, which is likely to bring price reduction in the related mar-
ket as well.  There is a short-run positive effect on competition, from which consumers will 
benefit.  However, the price reduction will decrease the profit of the monopolist which, in 
turn, is likely to reduce the monopolist’s incentives to invest.  Therefore, long-run negative 
effects from reduced incentives to invest are likely. 
Bergman, supra note 64, at 422. 
 173. See Gitter, supra note 59, at 222 & n.15 (describing intellectual property rights as “limited 
monopoly” rights). 
 174. See Alessandra Narciso, IMS Health or the Question Whether Intellectual Property Still De-
serves a Specific Approach in a Free Market Economy, 4 INTELL. PROP. Q. 445, 450-51 (2003). 
 175. Id. at 450. 
 176. Id. at 451. 
 177. See id. at 468 (contending that, rather than compulsory licensing becoming the norm, “[t]he 
conditions on which and the level at which copyright offers protection for information market goods 
should. . . be revised to get the balance right”). 
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possible solution is a shorter copyright term for information goods, so that 
competitors may enter the market sooner.178 
Professor Patterson expresses a different view, contending that when a 
company such as IMS creates a de facto standard, that firm merits the reve-
nues attributable to its invention, but not the revenues deriving merely from 
the benefits of standardization.179  In his opinion, the 1860 brick structure is 
valuable not because of any inherent value in that organizational method, 
but simply because pharmaceutical firms have invested money and time in 
order to adapt to it.180  As a related point, Professor Patterson suggests that 
IMS’s risk in developing the 1860 brick structure was limited, since phar-
maceutical firms collaborated in the database development.181  These ar-
guments fail for two reasons, however.  First, as noted previously, pharma-
ceutical firms would not have invested in developing the 1860 brick 
structure on their own.182  Moreover, because developed economies rely in-
creasingly upon information rather than manufactured goods,183 the value 
of intellectual property, especially works protected by copyright, often de-
rives from its interoperability as opposed to its creativity.  EC law nonethe-
less furnishes copyright protection for works such as the 1860 brick struc-
ture, so as to encourage trade in information. 
B. The ECJ’s Judgment in the IMS Action Subjects Firms to Too Broad a 
Duty to License by Negating the Traditional Requirement in Compul-
sory Licensing Cases of Two Distinct Markets 
In the IMS action, the ECJ interpreted existing case law to mean that 
compulsory licensing of intellectual property may be required even in cases 
where there are not two entirely separate markets, one upstream and one 
downstream, so long as “a potential market or even hypothetical market 
 
 178. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD 250–53 (2001) (advocating for a shorter term of copyright protection for digital 
works and software). 
 179. Patterson, supra note 8, at 1076 (stating that IMS “is not entitled to all the revenues from the 
standardization” and that the Commission “seems to have been correct, then, in imposing a licensing 
obligation on IMS Health”). 
 180. Id. at 1077 (claiming that demand for the 1860 brick structure “does not arise from any inher-
ent advantages in the intellectual property owner’s product, but from the contributions of its users”).  
Similarly, scholars suspect that the ECJ’s enforcement of the Commission’s compulsory licensing order 
in Magill was based in large part on the notion that the broadcasters did not merit copyright protection 
due to the lack of creative effort involved in compiling television listings.  See Gitter, supra note 59, at 
253–54 & nn.168–71 and accompanying text. 
 181. Patterson, supra note 8, at 1077–78. 
 182. See supra notes 161–164 and accompanying text. 
 183. See supra notes 174–176 and accompanying text. 
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can be identified” for the upstream input.184  This imposes too broad a duty 
to license upon firms holding intellectual property rights, thereby threaten-
ing to stifle innovation.185 
While the ECJ cited Magill and Bronner in support of the proposition 
that even a potential or hypothetical market will satisfy the two-market 
condition, reliance on these cases is misplaced.  With respect to Magill, a 
case that actually concerns intellectual property and therefore is more 
closely analogous, commentators have indeed recognized two distinct mar-
kets, one for television listings and the other for television guides.186  While 
the ECJ did not find two entirely separate markets in Bronner,187 it is clear 
that the markets for newspaper delivery and newspaper publishing do func-
tion independently.  In contrast, intellectual property typically cannot be 
marketed separately from the goods or services created through its use.188  
Indeed, the 1860 brick structure that organizes the gathering and presenta-
tion of pharmaceutical sales data cannot possibly be marketed separately 
from the regional sales data services sold by IMS and its competitors.189  In 
the final analysis, IMS’s competitors seek access to the brick structure in 
order to compete in the very same market in which IMS operates.190 
In articulating its interpretation of the two-market hypothesis, the ECJ 
cited Advocate General Tizzano’s opinion in the IMS action,191 which in-
 
 184. ECJ Judgment of 29 April 2004, supra note 1, para. 44; see supra note 137 and accompanying 
text. 
 185. See supra notes 172–173 and accompanying text (describing the importance of intellectual 
property rights for stimulating innovation). 
 186. See supra note 132. 
 187. See supra note 138. 
 188. See Jean-François Bellis, Article 82 and Refusals to License: The Advocate General Proposes 
a New Test in the IMS Health Case, 33 EUR. LAW. 58, 59 (2003) (stating that nearly all competition 
cases relating to intellectual property “will involve some activity that involves the mise en oeuvre of the 
IPRs in the form of goods or services which are necessarily sold on a market that is vertically adja-
cent”).  The Magill case was unusual in that the broadcasters had an incentive to produce and dissemi-
nate television listings even if they did not enjoy protection from competition in the market for televi-
sion guides.  See Derek Ridyard, Essential Facilities and the Obligation to Supply Competitors Under 
UK and EC Competition Law, 17 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 438, 446 (1996). 
 189. See Landolt & Ysewyn, supra note 12, at 43 (“In IMS Health the [intellectual property right] 
cannot support itself upon a related market.”). 
 190. See Dolmans & Ilan, supra note 27, at 14 (comparing the “actual” and “distinct” upstream and 
downstream markets of Bronner and Magill to the “potential demand” and “single market or production 
process” found in the IMS action). 
By contrast, in IMS, the 1860 brick structure was developed by IMS only for use in a single 
data service.  It was not marketed separately and it is not commercially rational for IMS to 
make it available to third parties.  IMS’s competitors do not claim it for any other purpose, 
and indeed it could not be used for any other purpose. 
Id. 
 191. ECJ Judgment of 29 April 2004, supra note 1, para. 44. 
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troduces as a hypothetical “classic example of the essential facility doc-
trine” the situation where “access to a port is indispensable in order to be 
able to provide maritime transport services in a given geographical mar-
ket.”192  This analogy is inapposite, however, because 
[u]nlike real property, [intellectual property] rights are only available if 
certain hurdles are overcome, normally including both creation and pub-
lication, and they are only available for a limited period of time.  To ap-
ply anti-monopoly rules by requiring reasonable access during this mo-
nopoly period would in such cases annul the grant of the monopoly right.  
This in turn would remove a policy tool which encourages production of 
intellectual property.  If this encouragement is not replaced in some other 
way . . ., this will result in a decrease in the rate of production.193 
Furthermore, 
[u]nlike physical property, intellectual property cannot be used without 
disclosure or the significant possibility of disclosure.  Once disclosed it 
is easily misappropriated, and thus its value is easily destroyed.  The 
owner of a football stadium can lock the gates to keep out those who will 
not pay for access, but the protections for . . . intellectual property are far 
less effective and rarely self-enforcing.  Thus, to preserve the incentives 
for creation of new knowledge, the legal system gives to the creator or 
inventor the ability to preserve the exclusivity of that knowledge, or the 
exclusivity of its use.194 
Another danger of the ECJ’s judgment in the IMS action is that it con-
tains no language limiting it to certain forms of copyright and could there-
fore be extended to include process patents.195  Dolmans and Ilan offer the 
prototypical example of a process patent for an improved method of syn-
thesizing a chemical compound, and explain that “if the patented process 
confers a big enough competitive advantage, it would be ‘indispensable,’ 
since if competitors cannot use it they would be eliminated from the mar-
ket.”196  Under the Advocate General’s test, any demand by competitors for 
 
 192. Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, supra note 25, para. 58.  This example is drawn from 
an actual case in which the Commission first referred explicitly to the essential facilities doctrine.  See 
Case IV/34.174,  B&I Line PLC v. Sealink Harbours Ltd. & Sealink Stena Ltd. (Commission Decision 
of 11 June 1992), [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 255 (1992).  In this action, a harbor owner that operated on the 
downstream market for car ferry services offered inferior harbor access to a competitor in the market 
for car ferry services.  Id.  The Commission invoked Article 82 (then Article 86) in its interim decision 
requiring the harbor owner to grant access to its competitor.  Id. at 265–66. 
 193. Stothers, supra note 154, at 91. 
 194. Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 128, at 1218–19. 
 195. See Dolmans & Ilan, supra note 27, at 14. 
 196. Id; see also Bellis, supra note 188, at 59 (“A complainant can always argue that IPRs are 
unique and that any attempt to ‘invent around’ them would be unreasonably difficult.”). 
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the indispensable facility would constitute a second market,197 triggering a 
duty to license intellectual property. 
C. The ECJ’s Judgment in the IMS Action Fails to Clarify What Sort of 
Product Satisfies the “New Product” Criterion Set Forth in Magill 
The ECJ’s judgment in the IMS action fails to clarify what sort of 
product will satisfy the criterion set forth in Magill that compulsory licens-
ing is not appropriate unless a refusal to license prevents the appearance of 
a new product for which there is potential consumer demand.198  In Magill, 
there was no question that Magill planned to offer a new product, as the 
company had created a comprehensive television guide that did not exist 
previously and would be cheaper for consumers than purchasing three 
separate guides.199  In the IMS action, the ECJ, operating pursuant to the 
EC law that reserves factual questions to the national courts,200 referred to 
the German national courts the question whether NDC will offer “at most, 
new variations of the same services and on the same market” as IMS,201 or 
a genuinely different, better product, as NDC contends.202  While it is ap-
propriate for the ECJ to defer to the German national courts on this factual 
question, the ECJ neglected to offer the national courts guidance on several 
important issues.  The ECJ failed to state whether the new product could 
exist on the same market as the existing product, and, if so, what character-
istics would make the product new.203  In addition, the ECJ did not specify 
how the national court should assess potential consumer demand (e.g. how 
many dissatisfied customers would have to be identified).204  Firms decid-
ing whether to invest in intellectual property therefore will not be able to 
rely on the ECJ judgment for guidance on this issue. 
 
 197. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (setting forth Advocate General Tizzano’s test for 
identifying separate markets in an Article 82 action). 
 198. See supra notes 120 and 146 and accompanying text (discussing new product criterion in 
Magill and its application by ECJ in the IMS action). 
 199. Magill, 1995 E.C.R. I-743, I-824, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 718, 791 (1995). 
 200. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 201. CFI Order of 26 October 2001, supra note 22, para. 101. 
 202. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 203. Estelle Derclaye, The IMS Health Decision: A Triple Victory, 27 WORLD COMPETITION 397, 
404 (2004).  Ms. Derclaye has pointed out that the ECJ judgment “could also be criticized for not speci-
fying a period of time (e.g., a few years) after which the license can be imposed” and has suggested that 
“[t]he Court ought perhaps to consider this in future decisions.”  Estelle Derclaye, The IMS Health De-
cision and the Reconciliation of Copyright and Competition Law, 29 EUR. L. REV. 687, 696 (2004). 
 204. Cf. Bruno LeBrun, IMS v. NDC: Advocate General Tizzano’s Opinion, 26 EUR. INTELL. PROP. 
REV. 84, 86 (noting that Advocate General Tizzano’s decision had failed to answer these questions and 
expressing hope that the ECJ would do so). 
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D. The ECJ Neglected to Elucidate the Requirement in Magill That a Re-
fusal to License an Indispensable Facility Must Lack Any Objective 
Business Justification in Order to Be Abusive 
As noted above, EC case law generally provides little guidance re-
garding the requirement set forth in Magill that the intellectual property 
holder’s refusal to license must prove unjustified in order to constitute an 
abuse of a dominant position.205  Nor did the ECJ seize the opportunity to 
clarify this issue in its IMS judgment.206  Commentators have noted that it 
is particularly important for intellectual property holders to know whether 
it is justifiable to refuse to license where the owner of the intellectual prop-
erty itself wishes to develop and market the new product for which the li-
cense is sought, for “[i]f not, competitors would effectively have a right of 
pre-emption on new inventions over the IP holder.”207  Once again, such a 
legal scheme would discourage innovation and encourage free-riding. 
V.  THE IMPLICATIONS FOR MICROSOFT CORPORATION  
OF THE ECJ’S JUDGMENT IN THE IMS ACTION 
Commentators have noted that the ECJ’s judgment in the IMS action 
will affect in particular information goods industries such as the software 
and information technology industries.  Pending before the EC at present is 
one such competition action relating to the refusal of Microsoft to license 
to its rivals certain computer information in which Microsoft claims intel-
lectual property rights.208 
A. The Commission’s Compulsory Licensing Order in the Microsoft Ac-
tion 
On March 24, 2004, after investigating for over five years, the Euro-
pean Commission concluded that Microsoft had violated Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty by refusing to license to rivals information that would permit 
them to create software that is compatible with Microsoft’s dominant oper-
ating system for personal computers (PC operating system).209  The Com-
 
 205. See supra notes 152–155 and accompanying text. 
 206. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 207. Dolmans and Ilan, supra note 27, at 15. 
 208. Commission of the European Communities, Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 (Case 
COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/ 
decisions/37792/en.pdf [hereinafter Commission Decision in Microsoft]. 
 209. See generally id.  This article will not address a second part of the Commission decision, the 
finding that Microsoft had violated Article 82 by bundling its Media Player program with the rest of 
Windows, because this aspect of the action is an alleged tying violation, id. at 209–302, rather than a 
refusal to deal and therefore is not affected by the ECJ’s judgment in the IMS action. 
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mission’s investigation into Microsoft began in 1998 when Sun Microsys-
tems Inc. (Sun) lodged a complaint with the Commission against Micro-
soft,210 which holds a ninety-five percent share of the worldwide market for 
PC operating systems with its Windows products.211  According to Sun, 
Microsoft infringed Article 82 by refusing to license certain information212 
that Microsoft contends is protected by intellectual property law.213  Ac-
cording to Sun, this information is necessary in order for Sun to achieve 
full interoperability between its software products for network computing, 
called work group server operating systems,214 and Microsoft Windows.215  
Sun contends that without access to this information that will allow it to 
achieve interoperability, Sun and other rivals will not be able to compete 
with Microsoft in the market for work group server operating systems.216 
The Commission decided in favor of Sun, ordering Microsoft, inter 
alia, to disclose to competitors, within one hundred twenty days, the infor-
mation required by them in order to enable their products to communicate 
with the Windows operating system.217  Microsoft must also update this in-
formation as it brings to market new versions of its products.218  In addi-
tion, the Commission imposed on Microsoft a fine of 497.2 million euros, 
roughly US$489 million219 for abusing its market power in the EU.220 
 
 210. Id. at 5. 
 211. Id. at 119 & n.555. 
 212. This information is not the Windows source code, which is not actually necessary to create 
interoperable products, but rather the “hooks” at the edge of the source code that allow communication 
between products.  See News Release No. 45/04, European Commission, European Commission Con-
cludes Microsoft Investigation, Imposes Conduct Remedies and a Fine (March 24, 2004), available at 
http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/2004/20040045.htm#(3) [hereinafter European Commission Con-
cludes Microsoft Investigation]. 
 213. Commission Decision in Microsoft, supra note 208, at 55. 
 214. The Commission has described work group server operating systems as “operating systems 
running on central network computers that provide services to office workers around the world in their 
day-to-day work, such as filesharing, security and user identity management.”  European Commission 
Concludes Microsoft Investigation, supra note 212. 
 215. Commission Decision in Microsoft, supra note 208, at 5. 
 216. Id.; see also European Commission Concludes Microsoft Investigation, supra note 212 (stat-
ing that Microsoft has acquired a dominant position in the market for work group server operating sys-
tems). 
 217. Commission Decision in Microsoft, supra note 208, at 299.  Microsoft will be entitled to “rea-
sonable remuneration for any of this interface information which may be protected by intellectual prop-
erty rights.”  Competition: Conduct Remedies and a Fine Imposed on Microsoft, EU FOCUS, Issue 142, 
Apr. 8, 2004, at 7, 7. 
 218. Commission Decision in Microsoft, supra note 208, at 300. 
 219. See xe.com The Interactive Currency Table™, at http://www.xe.net/ict/ (last visited Nov. 17, 
2004). 
 220. Commission Decision in Microsoft, supra note 208, at 299.  This fine relates both to Micro-
soft’s refusal to deal as well as its tying violation.  Id.  While it is the largest fine that the Commission 
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In June 2004 Microsoft appealed the Commission’s decision to the 
European Court of First Instance.221  Commentators also expect the com-
pany soon to file another appeal requesting the court to suspend the Com-
mission’s sanctions until the conclusion of the appeals procedure, which 
could take several years.222  The IMS action provides an example of such a 
measure, in that the CFI suspended the Commission’s interim order impos-
ing compulsory licensing until the resolution of the antitrust action before 
the EC courts, and the ECJ upheld the CFI judgment.223  Given the parallels 
between the IMS and Microsoft actions, the ECJ’s judgment in the IMS 
case is likely to influence the outcome of the Microsoft action pending be-
fore the CFI. 
B. The Ramifications of ECJ’s Judgment in the IMS Action for the Mi-
crosoft Case 
There are several parallels between the IMS and Microsoft actions.  
First, in both cases, rivals allege that a dominant firm’s refusal to license 
information protected by intellectual property law impedes competition in a 
related market in violation of Article 82.  In response, each dominant firm 
maintains that intellectual property protection is essential for stimulating 
innovation.224  Second, in both cases the dominant firm’s competitors al-
lege that the intellectual property at issue is indispensable because custom-
ers face insuperable obstacles to switching to an alternative.  In the IMS 
case, customers have become reliant upon the 1860 brick structure because 
 
has ever imposed on a single company for violations of EC competition law, see Treacy & Heide, supra 
note 59, the Commission could have established an even larger fine.  EC competition law permits the 
Commission to impose fines of up to ten percent of a firm’s worldwide turnover for the preceding busi-
ness year, see Commission Decision in Microsoft, supra note 208, at 292, but the Commission calcu-
lated the fine based on Microsoft’s European turnover only.  Treacy & Heide, supra note 59. 
 221. Simon Taylor, Microsoft Appeals Against EC’s Market Abuse Ruling, GUARDIAN (London), 
June 9, 2004, at 18; European Information Service, Computer Software/Competition: Microsoft 
Launches Appeal Against Commission Ruling in EU Courts, EUR. REP., June 9, 2004, LEXIS, News 
Library, Most Recent 90 Days File [hereinafter Microsoft Launches Appeal]. 
 222. Taylor, supra note 221. 
 223. See supra notes 73–81 and accompanying text. 
 224. See Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, supra note 25, para. 34 (paraphrasing IMS’s argu-
ment that lack of respect for intellectual property rights would have “very serious and undesirable con-
sequences for the market economy inasmuch as it would deprive the owners of an intellectual property 
right of the due recompense for their creative endeavour and would act as a disincentive to investments 
in innovation and research”); Commission Decision in Microsoft, supra note 208, at 190–91 (quoting 
Microsoft’s argument that “[intellectual property] rights are meant to protect the outcome of billions of 
dollars of R&D investments in software features, functions and technologies.  This is the essence of 
intellectual property right protection.  Disclosure would negate that protection and eliminate future in-
centives to invest in the creation of more intellectual property.”). 
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of the high switching costs.225  In the Microsoft action, the Windows tech-
nology exhibits network effects, meaning that the product is extremely 
valuable to consumers because so many other people use the same sys-
tem.226  Finally, the Commission ordered compulsory licensing of the intel-
lectual property at issue in each action.227 
The ECJ’s reliance upon Magill in its judgment in the IMS action 
demonstrates that the EC courts will apply the Magill criteria in competi-
tion cases involving intellectual property.228  Predictably, Microsoft and the 
Commission each claim that the ECJ’s interpretation in the IMS action of 
the Magill criteria supports its arguments.229 
The first Magill criterion requires that the dominant firm’s refusal to 
license impede the appearance of a new product desired by consumers be-
fore a violation of Article 82 will lie.230  Microsoft contends that its rivals 
in the server market do not offer new products or services in the market for 
work group server operating systems.231  The Commission, however, ar-
gues that Microsoft’s competitors offer products that are new in terms of 
improved reliability, security, and productivity.232  This case therefore 
bears a striking similarity to the IMS action, in that the dominant firm’s 
competitors plan to offer essentially the same product, but assert that they 
will introduce additional features.233 
The question whether a dominant firm’s competitors offer a new 
product that satisfies the Magill criterion presents a fact-specific inquiry, 
and in the IMS action the ECJ referred this issue to the German national 
court.234  In the Microsoft case, the EC courts likely will address this issue 
directly, as the action did not arise as a request for a preliminary ruling 
 
 225. See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text. 
 226. See Gitter, supra note 59, at 293 n.390 (describing network effects) (citation omitted); see also 
The New Economy Survey, ECONOMIST, Sept. 23, 2000, at 5, 30 (“If everybody you know uses Micro-
soft Word, then you will find life easier if you use it too.”). 
 227. See supra notes 70–71 (describing the Commission’s compulsory licensing order in the IMS 
action), 217–18 (explaining the Commission’s compulsory licensing order in the Microsoft action). 
 228. See supra notes 119–125 and accompanying text (describing the Magill criteria and noting 
that the ECJ applied them in the IMS action). 
 229. Paul Meller, Court Ruling in Europe Could Affect Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2004, at 
W7. 
 230. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 231. Daniel Dombey, Microsoft Says Ruling Will Help Its Fight With Brussels, FIN. TIMES (Lon-
don), Apr. 30, 2004, at 29. 
 232. See Commission Decision in Microsoft, supra note 208, at 186–88 & nn.840 & 841 (describ-
ing the enhanced features of the work group server operating system products offered by Microsoft’s 
competitors). 
 233. See supra notes 148–149 and accompanying text. 
 234. ECJ Judgment of 29 April 2004, supra note 1, paras. 49–50. 
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from a national court.  It is difficult to determine how the EC courts would 
decide this question, however, in light of the fact that the ECJ failed to clar-
ify in the IMS action precisely what factors will make a product new.235 
The second Magill criterion requires that the dominant firm’s refusal 
to license lack any objective business justification before it will be found to 
violate Article 82.236  The Commission rejected the primary justification 
proffered by the firm: that Microsoft holds intellectual property rights in its 
Windows products and will lack incentives to innovate if required to cede 
these rights.237  According to the Commission, “on balance, the possible 
negative impact of an order to supply on Microsoft’s incentives to innovate 
is outweighed by its positive impact on the level of innovation of the whole 
industry (including Microsoft)” and “the need to protect Microsoft’s incen-
tives to innovate cannot constitute an objective justification that would off-
set the exceptional circumstances identified.”238 
The Commission suggests that Microsoft’s refusal to license the in-
formation that would allow its competitors to achieve interoperability of 
their software stems from its desire to monopolize the market for work 
group server operating systems.239  If the CFI agrees with this assessment, 
then it will likely hold that Microsoft violated Article 82, as EC competi-
tion law precludes a firm from using its dominant position in one market in 
order to eliminate competition in a related but separate market.240 
Finally, the third Magill criterion provides that a dominant firm vio-
lates Article 82 only if its refusal to supply will effectively exclude all 
competition in a secondary, downstream market.241  Microsoft contends 
that in fact its interoperability information is not indispensable for down-
stream competitors, who have managed to launch successful products such 
as the freely distributed Linux work group server operating system.242  The 
Commission rejected this argument, emphasizing the risk that Microsoft’s 
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practices would eliminate all competition from the market.243  Once again, 
this question presents a fact-specific inquiry for the CFI, which must assess 
the strength of Microsoft’s competitors in the market. 
Notwithstanding the parallels between the Microsoft and IMS actions, 
there are some significant differences between them as well.  First, Micro-
soft had previously disclosed some of the information sought by its rivals 
and then ceased to do so.244  As the Commission noted in its decision, while 
such a fact pattern is not necessary in order for a court of find an abuse of a 
dominant position, past EC essential facilities cases have attached special 
importance to a dominant firm’s refusal to supply where it has disrupted 
previous levels of supply.245  This might lead the EC courts to uphold the 
Commission decision imposing a compulsory licensing obligation upon 
Microsoft. 
In addition, the existence of two entirely separate markets is clearer in 
the Microsoft action than in the IMS case.  The interoperability information 
in which Microsoft claims intellectual property protection is an integral 
part of its PC operating system, which exists on an entirely distinct market 
from work group server operating systems.  In the IMS example, however, 
the 1860 brick structure cannot be marketed separately from the pharma-
ceutical sales data that it organizes.  In light of the fact that the ECJ ex-
pressed approval of compulsory licensing of intellectual property in certain 
exceptional circumstances, that court may deem compulsory licensing ap-
propriate in the Microsoft case. 
On the other hand, the EC courts might decline to uphold the Com-
mission’s order in the Microsoft action in light of a provision in the 1991 
EC Software Directive, which has been implemented in the laws of all the 
EC Member States.246  The Directive permits lawful users, including com-
peting software manufacturers, to reverse engineer a computer program to 
obtain the interoperability information necessary to create a competing 
program.247  The Commission declared that reverse engineering was not a 
viable solution for Microsoft’s competitors, because the process would be 
too time-consuming in such a fast-moving industry (and possibly unsuc-
cessful due to the complexity of the information).248  In addition, the Com-
mission pointed out that Microsoft ultimately could upgrade its operating 
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system so as to destroy the compatibility achieved by its rivals through 
their reverse engineering efforts.249  If the EC courts do not accept the 
Commission’s reasoning, however, they might conclude that compulsory 
licensing is inappropriate in light of the ability of Microsoft’s competitors 
to deduce the interoperability information they seek through reverse engi-
neering. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The ECJ’s recent judgment in the IMS competition action, in which 
the court strives to balance the need to protect national intellectual property 
rights with the imperatives of EC competition law, is vulnerable to critique 
on several grounds, both because it subjects dominant firms to much 
broader duties to license than had prior ECJ judgments and because it ne-
glects to clarify some of the legal issues raised by the parties.  First, the 
ECJ placed too much emphasis, in determining whether intellectual prop-
erty is indispensable, upon the relevancy of customers’ participation in cre-
ating intellectual property and their potential costs in switching to an alter-
native.  Second, while previous EC cases finding a dominant firm’s refusal 
to supply to be abusive had required the existence of two different markets, 
meaning that the dominant firm’s refusal to license an essential facility had 
to impede competition in a distinct downstream market, the ECJ accepted 
in the IMS action a potential or hypothetical market to satisfy the two-
market criterion.  Third, the ECJ failed to clarify what sort of product will 
satisfy the condition set forth in Magill that a refusal to license cannot be 
abusive unless it impedes the emergence of a new product.  Finally, the 
ECJ neglected to elucidate the requirement in Magill that a refusal to li-
cense an indispensable facility must lack any objective business justifica-
tion in order to be abusive. 
What is clear after the ECJ judgment in the IMS action is that the 
court views compulsory licensing as an appropriate remedy for violation of 
Article 82 provided that certain conditions are met, even in cases involving 
new economy industries, which rely heavily upon intellectual property 
rights for stimulating research and development.  The Microsoft action 
pending before the EC courts presents such a case.  If the EC courts agree 
with the Commission that Microsoft’s refusal to license its interoperability 
information impedes the appearance of a new product, lacks any objective 
business justification, and excludes all competition in a secondary, down-
stream market, the courts will uphold the Commission’s compulsory licens-
ing order in this proceeding. 
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